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CYBERFINANCING FOR ECONOMIC JUSTICE
LISA T. ALEXANDER
ABSTRACT
This Article argues for the socially optimal regulation of online peerto-peer (P2P) lending and crowdfunding to advance economic justice in
the United States. Peer-to-peer lending websites, such as Prosper.com or
Kiva.org, facilitate lending transactions between individuals online without the involvement of a traditional bank or microfinance institution.
Crowdfunding websites, such as Kickstarter.com, enable individuals to obtain financing from large numbers of contributors at once through an open
online request for funds. These web-based transactions, and the intermediary
organizations that facilitate them, constitute emerging cyberfinancing markets.
These markets connect many individuals at once, across class, race, ethnicity, nationality, space, and time in an interactive and dynamic way. During a time of significant economic distress in the United States, these markets also represent an unprecedented economic development opportunity
for historically marginalized economic actors. Yet, no legal scholar has
addressed the implications of these developments for economic justice in
the United States. Drawing from the fields of law and geography, social
networking theory, and comparative institutional analysis, this Article conceptualizes these new markets as “cyberspaces,” similar to geographic spaces, whose laws, norms, and rules will partially determine who will benefit
from the economic opportunities that arise in these spaces. The recently
enacted Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act does not facilitate
substantial distributive justice in crowdfunding markets. The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), which produced a report in response to
the 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act’s mandate that it study the
P2P lending industry, has also failed to recommend a regulatory structure
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that will facilitate economic justice. This Article recommends that a range
of federal regulators such as the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), and
the U.S. Treasury Department (Treasury), should collaborate to implement a revised Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) that would promote
economic justice in these markets.
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INTRODUCTION
Social networking via the Internet now presents an unprecedented opportunity to link previously disconnected populations. Web 2.0 technologies1 create participatory communities of interest that link the poor and the
wealthy and defy the traditional limitations of geographically-bounded
space. Mobile phones now provide inexpensive Internet access, mitigating
the digital divide between poorer and richer consumers and enabling poorer individuals to access Web 2.0 technologies.2 Wealthy individuals can
now lend to poorer individuals, residing in any location, via peer-to-peer
(P2P) lending websites such as Prosper.com or Kiva.org.3 These websites
enable individuals to lend to one another online without the intermediation
of a traditional bank or financial institution. Crowdfunding4 websites, such
as Kickstarter.com, now enable budding entrepreneurs, residing anywhere
that has Internet access, to raise capital from individuals by soliciting contributions, or equity investments, through an open online call for funds.
These crowdfunding websites help entrepreneurs connect with large numbers of people at once, across the globe, to seek financing.
During a time of economic distress in the United States,5 these cyberfinancing websites present new economic development opportunities for inexperienced, geographically isolated and historically marginalized economic actors. Yet, no legal scholar has addressed the implications of these
developments for economic justice6 in the United States.7 Drawing from the
1

The term Web 2.0 generally describes web applications that facilitate “participatory
information sharing, interoperability, user-centered design and collaboration on the
Internet or World Wide Web.” Web 2.0, COMPUGAIN, http://www.compugain.com/taxo
nomy/term/43/0 (last visited Mar. 23, 2013).
2
RICHARD HEEKS, DEVELOPMENT 2.0: TRANSFORMATIVE ICT-ENABLED DEVELOPMENT
MODELS AND IMPACTS 1 (Development Informatics Short Paper No. 11, 2010), available
at http://www.sed.manchester.ac.uk/idpm/research/publications/wp/di/sh ort/di_sp11.pdf.
3
See, e.g., PROSPER.COM, http://www.prosper.com (last visited Mar. 23, 2013) (“We
connect people who want to invest money with people who want to borrow money.”);
KIVA.ORG, Loans That Change Lives, http://www.kiva.org/home (last visited Mar. 23,
2013) (“Empower people around the world with a $25 loan.”).
4
“Crowdfunding is an approach to raising capital for new projects and businesses by
soliciting contributions from a large number of stakeholders” through Internet-based
social networking sites. CROWDSOURCING.ORG, http://www.crowdsourcing.org/commun
ity/crowdfunding/7 (last visited Mar. 23, 2013).
5
See Hope Yen, U.S. Poverty on Track to Rise to Highest Since 1960s,
HUFFINGTONPOST.COM (July 22, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/07/22/us
-poverty-level-1960s_n_1692744.html (explaining that economists predict that “[t]he
official poverty rate will rise from 15.1 percent in 2010; climbing as high as 15.7 percent,”
increasing the ranks of America’s poor to levels unseen in nearly half a century).
6
The term, economic justice, as used here includes the concept of distributive justice,
defined as “[j]ustice owed by a community to its members, including the fair disbursement
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fields of law and geography, social networking theory, and comparative institutional analysis, this Article conceptualizes these websites as “cyberspaces,”
similar to geographic spaces, whose laws, community norms, and practices
will, partially, determine who will benefit from the economic opportunities
that occur in these “spaces.” These cyberspaces also create new communities
online because they connect previously disconnected individuals, facilitate
repeat transactions, and allow social networks to rate and evaluate participants. How the federal government regulates these emerging cyberfinancing communities will determine their redistributive potential.
This Article argues that regulating cyberfinancing8 for economic justice
will require a reconceptualization of the process of exchange between the
wealthy and the poor, as well as of the traditional legal structures and community economic development practices that regulate exchanges between
these groups. The Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS Act), recently
signed by President Obama,9 fails to increase, substantially, historically marginalized actors’ access to new crowdfunding markets. The GAO’s proposed
regulatory structure for P2P lending markets also fails to advance economic

of common advantages and sharing of common burdens.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 869
(7th ed. 1999).
7
Legal scholars studying domestic P2P lending have not recommended a regulatory
structure to maximize the participation of economic actors historically marginalized from
mainstream American markets. See, e.g., Andrew Verstein, The Misregulation of Personto-Person Lending, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 445 (2011); Eric C. Chaffee & Geoffrey Rapp,
Regulating Online Peer-to-Peer Lending in the Aftermath of Dodd-Frank: In Search of an
Evolving Regulatory Regime for an Evolving Industry, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 485
(2012); Sarah B. Lawsky, Money for Nothing: Charitable Deductions for Microfinance
Lenders, 61 SMU L. REV. 1525 (2008). Some legal scholars have analyzed the implications
of P2P lending for international law and development, but do not recommend a specific
scheme for U.S. regulation of P2P lending. See, e.g., Kevin E. Davis & Anna Gelpern, Peer
to Peer Financing for Development: Regulating the Intermediaries, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. &
POL’Y 1209 (2010); Raj M. Desai & Homi Kharas, Democratizing Foreign Aid: Online
Philanthropy and International Development, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 1111 (2010).
Legal scholars discussing crowdfunding have not proposed how to regulate the industry to
advance distributive justice. See, e.g., C. Stephen Bradford, Crowdfunding and the Federal
Securities Laws, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1 (2012) [hereinafter Bradford, Crowdfunding];
Nikki D. Pope, Crowdfunding Microstartups: It’s Time for the Securities and Exchange
Commission to Approve a Small Offering Exemption, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 973 (2011); Edan
Burkett, A Crowdfunding Exemption? Online Investment Crowdfunding and U.S. Securities
Regulation, 13 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 63 (2011). Legal scholars studying U.S.-based
community economic development law have also not turned their attention to these markets.
8
This Article coins the term “cyberfinancing” to describe both online P2P financing
and crowdfunding websites that enable financial transactions between users online.
9
Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012)
[hereinafter JOBS Act].
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justice.10 The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the primary regulator of P2P lending and crowdfunding websites, is regulating
these markets in a manner that restricts marginalized actors’ access. This
Article proposes that U.S. regulators, and industry self-regulatory groups,
should collaborate to implement a revised Community Reinvestment Act
(CRA) that would cover the cyberfinancing intermediary organizations
that create these websites and that would promote economic justice in these markets. While overregulation could increase the costs of participation,
thereby undermining access, the regulatory structure proposed here incentivizes participation, thereby reducing the costs of the regulatory burden.
Part I of this Article analyzes the law’s role in creating, and demarcating, economically marginalized, racially identified, and geographically
isolated spaces. Part I.A explains how creditworthy or entrepreneurially
promising individuals living in such communities are still isolated from
American mainstream markets. Part I.B explicates how some residents
developed informal and extra-legal responses to that economic and geographic isolation: responses such as face-to-face, peer-to-peer lending or
participation in unregulated fringe financial markets. Part I.B also describes how American community economic development (CED) laws
incentivize public and private investment in formally disinvested communities and formalize face-to-face peer lending by subsidizing communitybased non-profit organizations and microfinance institutions. The advantages and disadvantages of these approaches provide lessons for how
to regulate new cyberfinancing markets.
In Part II, the Article highlights examples of online P2P lending and
crowdfunding and explains the legal mechanisms and institutions through
which such market exchanges occur. It asserts that the SEC’s regulation of
cyberfinancing websites has led to a contraction of the market that excludes
more marginalized borrowers. It also argues that current and proposed U.S.
reforms do not substantially advance distributive justice in these markets.
Finally, in Part III, the Article draws on theoretical work on space, community, and power in the “networked society,” as well as comparative institutional analysis, to propose how cyberfinancing should be conceptualized
and regulated.
10

See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-613, PERSON-TO-PERSON LENDING:
NEW REGULATORY CHALLENGES COULD EMERGE AS THE INDUSTRY GROWS (2011), available
at http://www.gao.gov/assets/330/320693.pdf [hereinafter GAO REPORT]; see also DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 989F, 124
Stat. 1376, 1947–48 (2010) (requiring that the Comptroller General of the United States and
the United States Government Accountability Office should “determine the optimal Federal
regulatory structure” for P2P lending).
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I. THE LAW AND GEOGRAPHY OF ECONOMIC MARGINALIZATION IN THE
UNITED STATES
A. The Social and Legal Construction of Economic Marginality11
Critical social theorists have long argued that the societal “meanings” of
geographic space are socially produced.12 Although geographic spaces consist of tangible and natural physical objects, such as land, sky, and trees, the
social significance of these geographic formations is the product of social relations. Thus, geographic spaces have socially constructed meanings that are
reflections of historical, and present, social allocations of power. Law and
geography scholars13 have long argued that law plays a constitutive role in the
spatial allocations of power in various geographic areas.14 Thus, the social
“meanings” assigned to places are partly constituted by legal representations
of space. The boundaries, lines, and plats that divide up the physical world are
given social significance through the laws of property, ownership, title, and
11

“Marginality is generally used to describe and analyse socio-cultural, political, and
economic spheres, where disadvantaged people struggle to gain access (societal and spatial)
to resources, and full participation in social life.” Ghana S. Gurung & Michael Kollmair,
Marginality: Concepts and their Limitations (NCCR North South, Working Paper No. 4,
2005), available at http://www.nccr-pakistan.org/publications_pdf/General/Marginality.pdf.
12
See, e.g., Michel Foucault, Space, Knowledge & Power, in THE FOUCAULT READER
239 (Paul Rabinow ed., 1984) (“Space is fundamental in any form of communal life.”);
HENRI LEFEBVRE, THE PRODUCTION OF SPACE 26 (Donald Nicholson-Smith trans., 1991)
(1974) (“(Social) space is a (social) product.”); EDWARD W. SOJA, POSTMODERN
GEOGRAPHIES: THE REASSERTION OF SPACE IN CRITICAL SOCIAL THEORY 79–80 (1989)
(“Space in itself may be primordially given, but the organization, and meaning of space is
a product of social-translation, transformation and experience.”).
13
The work of law and geography scholars is too voluminous to cite in full, but the
following works are representative of the field. See, e.g., THE LEGAL GEOGRAPHIES
READER: LAW, POWER AND SPACE xviii (Nicholas Blomley et al., eds., 2001) [hereinafter
LEGAL GEOGRAPHIES READER]; LAW AND GEOGRAPHY: CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES 2002
(Jane Holder & Carolyn Harrison eds. 2002) [hereinafter LAW AND GEOGRAPHY];
NICHOLAS BLOMLEY, LAW, SPACE, AND THE GEOGRAPHIES OF POWER (1994); Richard
Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal Analysis, 107
HARV. L. REV. 1841 (1994) [hereinafter Ford, Boundaries of Race]; Hari Osofsky, A Law
and Geography Perspective on the New Haven School, 32 YALE J. OF INT’L L. 421
(2007); Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 311
(2002); Keith Aoki, Space Invaders: Critical Geography, the “Third World” in
International Law and Critical Race Theory, 45 VILL. L. REV. 913 (2000); Space
Invaders, Symposium, Surveying Law and Borders, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1037 (1996).
14
See LEGAL GEOGRAPHIES READER, supra note 13, at xviii (“Boundaries mean. They
signify, they differentiate, and they unify the insides of the spaces that they mark. What they
mean refers to constellations of social relational power. And the form that this meaning
often takes—the meaning social actors confer on lines and space—is legal meaning.”).
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territory, as well as through jurisdictional boundaries that include certain
physical areas within a particular neighborhood, municipality, town or village. These territorialities15 enable public officials, and residents within geographically defined boundaries, to create political alliances, wield taxing and
spending powers,16 and influence the boundaries and types of markets that
operate within certain geographic spaces.17 These boundaries also empower
individuals to include, or to exclude, others in their geographic communities
or markets.18 These “complex territorial configurations”19 of the physical and
material world often reinforce existing allocations of power and opportunity.
Space, power, and law, then, are inextricably linked.
Economic marginalization in the United States undeniably has a racial,
ethnic, classed, gendered, and spatial dimension.20 As legal scholar Richard Thompson Ford explains, in America, space “is an ‘enabling technology’ of race.”21 As David Delaney explains, the practices that established
and maintained the racial purity and the political, economic, and social
superiority of whites were fundamentally spatial practices such as the
“slave quarters,” physically segregated housing, schooling, and socializing
spaces.22 Many of these spatial practices were also legal practices such as:
black codes, racially restrictive covenants, exclusionary zoning, and eminent
domain laws, amongst other legal mechanisms.23 “Much of the meaning that
15

See, e.g., DAVID DELANEY, RACE, PLACE, AND THE LAW, 1836–1948, 6 (1998) (Territoriality is “the assignment of a particular sort of meaning to lines and spaces in order to
control, at first glance, determinable segments of the physical world. Upon further
reflection, however, it is clear that the objects of control are social relationships and the
actions and experiences of people.”).
16
See id. at 6–7; see also Ford, Boundaries of Race, supra note 13, at 1844 (“The
reification of boundaries in private associations has effects of racial segregation and
economic stratification similar to those we uncovered in the public law context.”).
17
See, e.g., Michael E. Porter, The Competitive Advantage of the Inner City, 73 HARV.
BUS. REV. 55 (May–June 1995) (discussing the relationship between geographic location
and business development). But see Scott L. Cummings, Between Markets and Politics: A
Response to Porter’s Competitive Advantage Thesis, 82 OR. L. REV. 901, 903 (2003)
(arguing that market development is the result of politics as well as individual choices).
18
See supra note 13.
19
See DELANEY, supra note 15, at 6 (“[C]omplex territorial configurations—and the
codes of access, exclusion, and inclusion of which these configurations are the physical
expression—are inseparable from the workings of larger-scale power orders such as those
associated with, in our world, gender, race and class.”).
20
See supra note 13.
21
See LEGAL GEOGRAPHIES READER, supra note 13, at xvi (citing Richard T. Ford,
Urban Space and the Color Line: The Consequences of Demarcation and Disorientation
in the Post-Modern Metropolis, 9 HARV. BLACKLETTER J. 99–123 (1999)).
22
See DELANEY, supra note 15, at 10.
23
See id. at 10–11.
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is mapped onto lived-in landscapes is specifically legal meaning.”24 Certain physical areas, demarcated by legal apparatus such as street names,
plats, lines, and titles, as well as incorporation or unincorporation, were
designated as black, white, or immigrant areas.25
These “racially identified spaces”26 also often became economically
inferior spaces because the U.S. federal government and U.S. financial
institutions refused to lend or invest in those areas.27 In 1933, during the
Great Depression, Congress created the Home Owner’s Loan Corporation
(HOLC) to help underwater homeowners facing foreclosure by refinancing home mortgages and reforming the home mortgage system.28 The
HOLC devised a neighborhood-based rating system for determining home
lending risks based upon the presumed credit quality of neighborhoods
and their residents.29 HOLC appraisers “consistently undervalued black
and integrated neighborhoods for the purpose of making new mortgage
loans.”30 Appraisers identified minority neighborhoods by drawing red
lines or circles around them on geographic maps,31 demarcating them and
their residents as substantial credit and investment risks.
U.S. private banks, using those same maps, “redlined”32 certain lowincome, urban, minority, and immigrant communities, designating anyone
residing in these areas as a substantial credit risk based primarily upon the
24

Id. at 11.
See Ford, Boundaries of Race, supra note 13.
26
Id. at 1845 (defining “racially identified space” as “physical space primarily
associated with and occupied by a particular racial group”); see also Elise C. Boddie,
Racial Territoriality, 58 UCLA L. REV. 401 (arguing that places can have a racial identify
based upon socially engrained racial biases about the inhabitants of those places).
27
See generally Keith N. Hylton & Vincent D. Rougeau, Lending Discrimination:
Economic Theory, Econometric Evidence, and the Community Reinvestment Act, 85 GEO.
L. J. 237, 241 (1996) (describing the history of public and private redlining); Richard
Marsico, The Community Reinvestment Act, in BUILDING HEALTHY COMMUNITIES: A
GUIDE TO COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT FOR ADVOCATES, LAWYERS AND POLICYMAKERS
403 (ABA 2009) [hereinafter Marsico, Community Reinvestment Act] (explaining that the
Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) was enacted to remedy redlining).
28
Jerry W. Markham, The Subprime Crisis—A Test Match for the Bankers: Glass
Steagall vs. Gramm-Leach-Bliley, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1081 (2010).
29
Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Stimulus and Civil Rights, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 154, 163
n.36 (2011) [hereinafter Johnson, Stimulus and Civil Rights] (defining “redlining” as “the
government and industry practice that began in the 1920s and 1930s of assigning risks to
neighborhoods ... based on assessments of their quality”).
30
Id. at 163.
31
See Hylton & Roug supra note 27, at 241; Marsico, Community Reinvestment Act,
supra note 27, at 403; Johnson, Stimulus and Civil Rights, supra note 29, at 163 n.36.
32
See Johnson, Stimulus and Civil Rights, supra note 29, at 163.
25
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racial demographics of the area.33 Creditworthy individuals who lived in
redlined communities were, therefore, discriminated against based upon
both their race and their residence. Not only individuals, but also neighborhoods were denied private investment and credit, leading to a widespread disinvestment in certain neighborhoods where there were significant numbers of minorities.34 This neighborhood-based disinvestment
further solidified the poverty of many members of minority groups living
in urban centers as jobs, property tax-financed education, and other forms
of economic stability and social progress moved to suburban, predominately white communities. The quality of the social and educational services available in these neighborhoods also declined as the economic resources of these communities deteriorated. These dynamics led to an
increasing spatial mismatch between low-income, urban minorities, available quality jobs, and financial opportunities.35
While de jure discrimination, and intentional racial animus, initially
created racially identified spaces, as legal scholar Richard Thompson Ford
argues, “even in the absence of racism, race-neutral policy could be expected to entrench segregation and socio-economic stratification in a society with a history of racism.”36 The racial, economic, and geographic isolation caused by formal racism is maintained through the preservation of
political and geographic territories. In a capitalistic society that privileges
individual economic security, profit maximization by market actors, and
state and local taxation as the means through which basic governmental
services are provided, individuals and institutions may favor laws and policies that maintain the economic superiority of the geographic spaces they
inhabit, even in the absence of intentional racism. Consequently, spaces
“racially identified” as Black, for example, and economically marginalized
as a result of that designation, would be disadvantaged in competitions with
other geographic areas for residents, resources, opportunities, and markets.37

33

See Adam J. Levitin & Susan M. Wachter, Explaining the Housing Bubble, 100 GEO.
L.J. 1177, 1214 (2012) (defining redlining as “the practice of not offering financial services
in minority or low-income neighborhoods, sometimes indicated with a red line on a map”).
34
See Johnson, Stimulus and Civil Rights, supra note 29, at 163 (explaining that
redlining contributed to the deterioration of predominately black neighborhoods).
35
John F. Kain, Housing Segregation, Negro Employment and Metropolitan
Decentralization, 82:2 Q. J. OF ECON. 175–97 (defining the spatial mismatch hypothesis).
36
Ford, Boundaries of Race, supra note 13, at 1852.
37
See, e.g., Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416,
418–19, 422 (1956) (arguing that people move from economically, socially, and politically
disadvantageous localities to more advantageous ones); Lee Anne Fennell, Controlling
Residential Stakes, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 143, 173 (2010) (explaining the Tiebout hypothesis).
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To the extent that laws maintain the geographic boundaries of a given
racially identified community, and that economic stratification remains
pervasive within those areas, traditional financial institutions may still
have rational economic reasons for credit and investment rationing in such
areas.38 First, profit-motivated banks may be unable to overcome the inefficiencies associated with lending to economically marginal individuals
living in historically disinvested communities.39 If banks have insufficient
branches in certain areas, they may suffer from information asymmetries,
precluding them from learning about other factors that may make an otherwise marginal borrower a good credit risk.40 The transaction costs associated with the due diligence necessary to screen marginal borrowers or to
make unsecured loans in relatively small amounts to marginal borrowers,
may preclude banks from engaging in such transactions.41
Second, banks no longer obtain information about potential borrowers
solely through neighborhood-based branches. They also obtain this information about prospective borrowers through automated underwriting
computer models and risk profiling programs. Existing risk profiling and
underwriting models may steer banks away from individuals who do not
meet standardized lending profiles.42 These automated underwriting models may fail to identify individuals who are good credit risks because there
is insufficient computer generated quantitative information about such individuals, such as credit or job histories.43 Additionally, if individuals residing in historically disinvested communities have not had access to significant educational or job opportunities, then angel or venture capital
investors may lack information about their potential as entrepreneurs, and

38

See, e.g., Lan Cao, Looking at Communities and Markets, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
841, 853–57 (1999); Joseph E. Stiglitz & Alan Weiss, Credit Rationing in Markets with
Imperfect Information, 71:3 AM. ECON. REV. 393, 395 (1981).
39
See Cao, supra note 38, at 853–57; Stiglitz & Weiss, supra note 38, at 393.
40
See Tiebout, supra note 37; see also JOSH SILVER & ARCHANA PRADHAN, NATIONAL
COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT COALITION, WHY BRANCH CLOSURES ARE BAD FOR
COMMUNITIES 2 (Apr. 2012) (explaining that during the Great Recession, “bank and credit
union branches increased by 1,000 in middle- and upper-income neighborhoods while
decreasing by 530 in low-and moderate-income neighborhoods and branches increased in
predominately white neighborhoods by 598 while decreasing by 186 in minority neighborhoods where more than 50 percent of the residents are minority”).
41
See, e.g., Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Reflection in a Distant Mirror: Why the West Has
Misperceived the Grameen Bank’s Vision of Microcredit, 41 STAN. J. INT’L L. 217, 266–67
(2005) (explaining the high transaction costs associated with lending to marginal borrowers
that preclude traditional banks from lending).
42
See Cao, supra note 38, at 856.
43
See id.

320

WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 4:309

may be reluctant to provide start-up capital to them.44 Third, individuals
residing in racially identified and economically marginalized communities
may lack the resources to fully understand their credit or financial options.
If creditworthy individuals living in historically, or currently, disinvested
neighborhoods are unaware of financial options outside of their neighborhoods, because traditional banking institutions do not have a significant
presence there, they may self-limit their lending or financing options.
Even if individuals begin to improve their economic circumstances, if
their mobility is restricted, because of discriminatory housing practices or
a lack of affordable options in more lucrative neighborhoods, then they are
still geographically and economically isolated from mainstream markets.
An individual may also have familial connections in his or her neighborhood that that dissuade him or her from moving. Further, even as economic conditions improve in a space, previously racially identified (and economically marginalized as a result of that designation), the connotative
discourses,45 which give that geographic space its social signifiers, can
still perpetuate a narrative about that community that designates it as a bad
investment. Thus, mainstream banks may not locate there, productive high
paying industries may continue to resist establishing offices there, and white
or wealthier residents may not want to move there.46 The geographic location in which an individual resides, therefore, can limit his or her access to
mainstream market forces even as that individual’s economic circumstances
improve and economic conditions in the neighborhood progress.47
Most importantly, these spatial dynamics of economic marginalization
can also affect an individual’s ability to access social networks that might
lead to greater economic empowerment. The term social capital reflects the
sociologically demonstrated truth that individuals’ social networks can have
economic value.48 A socially well-connected individual has more opportunities to connect to networks that lead to greater economic opportunities.
Scholars have distinguished “bonding social capital” from “bridging social
capital.”49 Bonding social capital refers to closely knit networks among
44

Susan Jones, Supporting Urban Entrepreneurs: Law, Policy and the Role of
Lawyers in Small Business Development, 30 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 71, 87–88 (2007)
(explaining that women and minority entrepreneurs are not part of the old boy or new
entrepreneur networks that characterize venture capital and angel investing).
45
See, e.g., LEFEBVRE, supra note 12, at 56; Boddie, supra note 26.
46
See Ford, Boundaries of Race, supra note 13, at 1851–52.
47
See id.
48
See, e.g., ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF
AMERICAN COMMUNITY 18–20 (2000) (asserting that individuals’ abilities to develop positive
economic and social networks is largely a result of the geographic spaces they inhabit).
49
See id. at 22.
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people who are familiar with one another based upon face-to-face interactions in the same geographic area or through racial, ethnic, gender, or class
ties.50 Bridging social capital indicates a form of networking that enables individuals to connect with broader social networks outside of their immediate
geographic, familial, or friendship networks.51 Some neighborhood effects
scholars argue that neighborhoods plagued by concentrated poverty, racial
segregation, and geographic isolation from mainstream markets preclude individuals from developing the bridging social networks necessary to connect
to opportunity.52 Individuals who may be promising entrepreneurs, or who
are creditworthy based upon their credit scores, may still be geographically
isolated from the kind of positive social networks that will lead to financing
opportunities.53 New online cyberfinancing networks hold the potential to
help such individuals overcome their isolation, yet these industries do not currently operate, and are not currently regulated, to advance this goal. This history of economic marginalization in the United States should inform approaches to regulating new cyberfinancing markets.
B. Informal and Extra-Legal Responses to Spatial and Economic Marginality
In light of this isolation, certain groups developed alternative informal,
face-to-face, peer-to-peer, financing networks. Rotating savings and credit
associations (ROSCAs) have long been used by immigrant and ethnic groups
in the United States to create savings, to pay for small-scale personal expenses, or to finance micro-entrepreneurial activity.54 Trinidadian immigrants call
such mechanisms a sou-sou;55 Mexicans, the tanda;56 West Africans, the
esusu; Japanese, the tanomoshi; Chinese, the Hui; Koreans, the gae; Filipinos, the Hulagan; and Vietnamese, the Bui.57 Through peer financing,

50

Id.
Id.
52
See generally William Julius Wilson, Why Both Social Structure and Culture Matter in a Holistic Analysis of Inner-City Poverty, 629 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC.
SCI. 200, 206 (2010) (arguing that neighborhood concentrated poverty increases the
likelihood of social isolation).
53
See discussion infra Part I.D.
54
See Cao, supra note 38, at 884–92 (providing a history of ROSCAs in the United States).
55
Ralph Holcomb, Sou Sou Banking in Trinidad: Example of an Informal Mutual Aid
Society (on file with author).
56
See ROSALBA GAMA, DELMA MEDRANO & LUIS MEDRANO, TANDAS & CUNDINAS:
MEXICAN AMERICAN & LATINO AMERICAN ROTATING CREDIT ASSOCIATIONS IN CALIFORNIA,
http://www.anthro.uci.edu/html/Programs/Anthro_Money/Tandas.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2013).
57
See Isao Fujimoto & Gerardo Sandoval, Tapping into California’s Central Valley’s
Hidden Wealth: It’s Rich Cultural Capital, 9 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 119, 131
51
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individuals informally come together to make regular cyclical contributions to a common fund, the balance of which is then given as a lump sum
to one member in each cycle.58 Participants often do not invest these funds
in a formal bank, rather the funds are held by members of the group and
then distributed amongst group members. These forms of peer savings and
lending rely on trust among members of the same geographic, racial, or
ethnic group to serve as a form of collateral.59 Individuals must trust that
other group members will repay their loans so that there is sufficient money in the pot for their own loans. ROSCAs, therefore, are manifestations
of bonding social capital, whereby a tightly knit group of individuals trust
each other enough to develop an economic alternative to their geographic,
social, racial, ethnic, and economic isolation. ROSCAs also serve a community building function as members meet through face-to-face interactions and are able to vouch for the credit- or trust-worthiness of a particular member because of their friendship with, or history of face-to-face
interactions with, that member.60 This pooling of resources between tightly knit groups serves as a form of community economic development for
economically marginalized groups.61
Community norms and reputational sanctions also substitute for regulation as a form of censure for failure to repay.62 Additionally, each participant in a rotating savings and credit association is both a lender and borrower during the life cycle of the ROSCA.63 This feature of the ROSCA
aligns the incentives of borrowers and lenders in a manner that is different
from the incentive structures in more traditional credit markets—where lenders are commercial banks with profit maximization concerns and borrowers
are individuals in need of credit or capital to fund activities. The ROSCA’s
incentive structure “is one that [in theory] maximizes group and individual
welfare while minimizing the possibility of defection and exploitation, as
well as other forms of abuse.”64 In Looking at Communities and Markets,
(2007); see also Barack D. Richman, How Community Institutions Create Economic
Advantage: Jewish Diamond Merchants in New York, 31 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 383 (2006).
58
HARI SRINIVAS, ROSCAS: THE MUTUALITY OF CREDIT: ROTATING CREDIT AND
SAVINGS ASSOCIATIONS, http://www.gdrc.org/icm/suppliers/rosca.html (last visited Mar.
23, 2013); see also Cao, supra note 38, at 877.
59
See, e.g., Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Reflection in a Distant Mirror: Why the West Has
Misperceived the Grameen Bank’s Vision of Microcredit, 41 STAN. J. INT’L L. 217, 268
(2005) (describing solidarity circles).
60
See id. at 221.
61
See, e.g., Cao, supra note 38, at 875.
62
See id. at 882–84.
63
See id. at 849 (“[A] rotating credit association functions on the basis of aggregation of
interests between borrowers and lenders, precisely because the lender is the borrower.”).
64
Id.
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legal scholar Lan Cao argues that ROSCAs can help mainstream banks
overcome the information asymmetries and transaction costs that might
preclude them from lending to risky borrowers in marginal communities.65
Cao asserts that the community norms that regulate ROSCAs are reliable,
and that states, and presumably the federal government, should defer to
these norms and not attempt to regulate these financial transactions.66 Her
analysis of ROSCAs presents an optimistic assessment of the social dynamics among members of ROSCAs.
While face-to-face, peer-to-peer financing can be a positive form of
bonding social capital, it can also be exploitative.67 Studies of the dynamics
of ROSCAs in international developing economies often reveal that group
members can use exploitative tactics to ensure that members repay.68 The
trust and community norms that substitute for regulation can also surmount
to undue peer pressure. Further, ROSCAs and informal peer lending rarely
lead to bridging social capital, whereby economically marginal and geographically isolated groups connect to broader economic and social networks that lead to greater economic opportunities. However, ROSCAs do
create an alternative market space in which members of historically marginalized groups can obtain limited financing.
C. The Formalization of Peer Financing Through Microfinance
CED69 lawyers and practitioners in the United States sought to formalize ROSCAs and face-to-face peer lending through the development of
non-profit, community-based, microfinance organizations. These organizations provide financing to small and start-up American microenterprises.
In the United States, the term microenterprise usually describes “any type
of business that has fewer than five employees and is small enough to
benefit from loans of under $35,000.”70 Thus, not every small business is a
microenterprise; some start-ups require significantly greater initial investment
65

See id. at 885–89.
See id. at 906–09.
67
See Dyal-Chand, supra note 59, at 254–56.
68
See id. at 255–56.
69
See Cummings, supra note 17, at 906 (explaining that U.S.-based CED efforts are
spearheaded by non-profit organizations that receive public and private subsidies to
stimulate economic development in disadvantaged areas to benefit poor residents).
70
Susan R. Jones & Amanda Spratley, How Microenterprise Contributes to CED in
BUILDING HEALTHY COMMUNITIES: A GUIDE TO COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT FOR
ADVOCATES, LAWYERS AND POLICYMAKERS 380 (ABA 2009) (quoting Association for
Enterprise Opportunity, Microenterprise Development in the United States: An Overview,
Microenterprise Fact Sheet Series, 1 (2000), http://fieldus.org/publications/fact_sheet1.pdf).
66
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capital than microfinance provides and other small businesses have more
than five employees and substantial revenues and profits. The popularity
of microfinance as an antidote to poverty and market failure in the United
States increased with the Grameen Bank’s (the Bank’s) success with microlending to low-income, rural, women in the developing world.71
Founded in 1983 in Bangladesh, by 2006 Nobel Prize winner Muhammed
Yunus, the Bank has had significant success in uncollateralized microlending in developing countries.72 The Bank is a borrowers’ cooperative73 that
makes small, unsecured loans often without requiring formal collateral, formal legal instruments, group guarantees, or joint liability for defaults.74 The
interest rate on all loans is sixteen percent and the loans are generally repaid by borrowers in small increments over the course of a year or less.75
Currently, approximately ninety-six percent of the Bank’s loans are repaid
by microborrowers.76
The Bank formalizes aspects of the informal ROSCA model by establishing branches in low-income communities and requiring all borrowers to
be organized into small, homogenous, five-member “solidarity groups.”77
These groups are the mechanisms through which the bank disburses loans.
Before loans are disbursed to any one member of the group, all group members must attend a one or two-week-long training session in which they
learn the Bank’s lending rules as well as how to run a microenterprise.78
71

See, e.g., Lewis D. Solomon, Microenterprise: Human Reconstruction in America’s Inner
Cities, 15 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 191, 195 (1992); Dyal-Chand, supra note 59, at 223–24.
72
See Dyal-Chand, supra note 59, at 194–95. Note that Muhammad Yunus departed
from the Grameen Bank on May 15, 2011. See, e.g., A Letter Addressed to Grameen
Bank Members from Nobel Laureate Professor Muhammad Yunus on the Occasion of His
Departure from Grameen Bank, GRAMEEN COMMC’NS (May 15, 2011), http://grameen-in
fo.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1043.
73
See Solomon, supra note 71, at 195 (“[B]orrowers owning 75% and the government owning the remainder of the ... shares.”).
74
See, e.g., Credit Delivery System, GRAMEEN COMMC’NS, http://www.grameen-info.org/in
dex.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=24&Itemid=169 (last visited Mar. 23, 2013).
75
See id.
76
Bank Monthly Update in USD, GRAMEEN COMMC’NS, http://www.grameen-info.org/in
dex.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=453&Itemid=527 (last visited Mar. 23, 2013).
77
See, e.g., GRAMEEN COMMC’NS, supra note 74; Solomon, supra note 71, at 196.
78
The Women’s Self-Employment Project (WSEP) incorporated in 1986 was one of the
first U.S., non-profit, organizations to adopt the Grameen model. During the organization’s
years of operation it was a substantial source of capital and training for low-income,
predominately African-American women microentrepreneurs. See Solomon, supra note 71, at
202–03. However, WSEP was a subsidiary of the famous Chicago-based ShoreBank, a
community bank founded in 1973, to revitalize disinvested and redlined black neighborhoods.
The bank was profitable until the foreclosure crisis and the Great Recession when it failed. As
a result, WSEP also folded. See, e.g., Becky Yerak, Chicago’s ShoreBank Fails, Is Bought by
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These training sessions emphasize and implement the Bank’s “Sixteen Decisions”—a social development agenda that requires borrowers to engage in
positive healthy behaviors that promote self-sufficiency, but also positive
community development.79 The solidarity groups and the sixteen decisions
are the community-norm generation mechanisms that substitute for collateral and formal laws for failure to repay.80 While the solidarity group does
not guarantee the loans extended to members, another member cannot receive their disbursement until the first lender repays—thus, giving all
group members an incentive to enforce one another’s repayment.81 Further, because the Bank lends through groups, rather than individuals, it
mitigates the transaction costs associated with making small loans to individual borrowers.
Inspired by the success of the Grameen model, some American microfinance institutions (MFIs) have adopted a similar structure and design.82 Project Enterprise, based in New York City, is a non-profit MFI that initially
served primarily low-income, minority women microentrepreneurs in NYC.83
It subsequently expanded its operations to serve male and female lowincome, minority microentrepreneurs.84 It also collaborates with other established national MFIs.85 ACCION USA (ACCION) is another American MFI
that adapts the Grameen model in significant ways.86 It is the domestic

Investors, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 20, 2010, at 1, available at http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2010
-08-20/business/ct-biz-0821-shorebank-20100820_1_fdic-assets-david-vitale.
79
See, e.g., Dyal-Chand, supra note 59, at 233.
80
See id. at 225–30.
81
See id. at 225.
82
See, e.g., Solomon, supra note 71, at 202–06; Dyal-Chand, supra note 59, at 234–41.
83
See About Us, PROJECT ENTERPRISE, http://www.projectenterprise.org/About/where
.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2013).
84
See Mission & History, PROJECT ENTERPRISE, http://www.projectenterprise.org/About
/mission.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2013).
85
Project Enterprise works primarily in Upper Manhattan, Brooklyn, Queens, and the
Bronx. Ninety-nine percent of the businesses PE serves are minority-owned, eighty-eight percent
are African-American or Caribbean-American owned, and fifty-six percent are owned by
women. See About Us, PROJECT ENTERPRISE, supra note 83; Interview with Catherine Barnett,
Executive Director, Project Enterprise in NY, NY (Jul. 18, 2011). The Grameen Foundation is a
U.S.-based 501(c)(3) non-profit microfinance institution based upon the Grameen Bank model.
It is a separate organization with an independent board and staff. See, e.g., Frequently Asked
Questions, GRAMEEN FOUNDATION, http://grameenfoundation.org/faq#whatisgf (last visited
Mar. 23, 2013). In the United States, the Grameen Foundation works with partner microfinance
institutions such as Project Enterprise. See, e.g., United States, GRAMEEN FOUNDATION, http://
grameenfoundation.org/americas/united-states (last visited Mar. 23, 2013).
86
ACCION’s active clients are sixty-one percent Hispanic or Latino, twenty-seven
percent African-American, and forty percent female. See, e.g., Our Microloan Borrowers,
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American arm of ACCION International, a global microfinance organization.87 In total, ACCION provides seventy-five percent of microloan services in the United States.88 It funds borrowers with credit scores of 525 and
above, a lower minimum credit score than most mainstream American financial institutions require.89 ACCION requires borrowers to obtain assetbased collateral or guarantees for their loans.90 It does not use a group lending or collateralization model, but it encourages group-administered financial education and refers borrowers to a network of community-based technical assistance providers.91 ACCION’s loan amounts, which range from
$700 to $50,000 per loan with an average loan amount of $5100, are generally larger than that of Grameen and other international microfinance institutions.92 ACCION’s loan terms range from six to sixty months; its interest
rates, which range from eight to fifteen percent, are also generally lower than
those of less established international microfinance institutions.93 ACCION’s
borrowers repay their loans more than eighty-nine percent of the time.94
ACCION and similar American MFIs95 represent a trend in U.S. microfinance whereby American MFIs are quasi-financial institutions that
intermediate between risky, marginal borrowers and mainstream markets
for credit and capital. These institutions adopt some of the features of
ROSCAs, but they also utilize more traditional financial measures to determine creditworthiness. While Grameen delegates the selection of borrowers, the determination of borrowers’ creditworthiness, and peer financial
ACCION USA, http://www.accionusa.org/home/support-accion/learn/meet-our-borrowers
.aspx (last visited Mar. 23, 2013).
87
See, e.g., Microfinance FAQ, ACCION USA, http://www.accionusa.org/home/sup
port-accion/about-accion/microfinance-faq.aspx#2 (last visited Mar. 23, 2013).
88
Id.
89
ACCION USA also only accepts borrowers who have not declared bankruptcy in the
past twelve months or foreclosure in the past twenty-four months. Borrowers also may not
have any late mortgage or rent payments in the last twelve months. Borrowers must be current
on all bills and not have more than $3000 in past due debt because of extenuating circumstances. See, e.g., Basic Loan Requirements, ACCION USA, http://www.accionusa.org/home/small
-business-loans/about-our-loans/general-loan-requirements.aspx (last visited Mar. 23, 2013).
90
See Group vs. Individual Lending, ACCION USA, http://www.accionusa.org/home
/support-accion/learn/microlending-in-the-united-states.aspx (last visited Mar. 23, 2013).
91
See Microfinance FAQs, ACCION USA, http://www.accionusa.org/home/support-ac
cion/about-accion/microfinance-faq.aspx (last visited Mar. 23, 2013).
92
See id.
93
See id.
94
See id.
95
The Association for Enterprise Opportunity (AEO) is also a national membership organization for microfinance and microbusiness development institutions in the United States.
See, e.g., About AEO, ASS’N FOR ENTERPRISE OPPORTUNITY (May 22, 2009), http://www.aeo
works.org/index.php/site/page/category/about_aeo/.
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education to the solidarity group, many U.S. microfinance institutions retain
these functions.96 Retaining these due diligence and financial education features helps the MFIs mitigate financial risks, but it is also extremely costly
for them. Thus, a typical for-profit mainstream financial institution would
not want to incur the costs associated with a small $2000 loan. The loan
amounts, and the interest earned on them are not substantial enough to cover
these retained due diligence costs. Consequently, American MFIs are often
non-profits that rely on charitable contributions, and social investments
from individuals, corporations and foundations to cover these costs.97
The non-profit form permits the microfinance organizations to provide
these services, which are consistent with the non-profit forms’ charitable
purposes, and it enables these MFIs to obtain tax-deductible contributions
to cover their costs. Further, the federal and state monitoring that accompanies the process of non-profit formation and maintenance helps to ensure that the MFIs administer funds ethically. The non-profit form also
helps formalize the process of peer financing by minimizing the potential
for abuse between group members in unregulated ROSCAs or peer financing circles. However, the formalization of peer financing through nonprofits also increases borrowers’ transaction costs over and above the costs
associated with obtaining a loan from a mainstream lender, or a fringe financial services institution.98 The training that domestic non-profit organizations provide, as precondition of receiving financing, is often more substantial than what international microfinance institutions or informal
ROSCAs provide. Consequently, U.S. microborrowers participating in
domestic microfinance programs have to attend several meetings.99 This
aspect of non-profit microfinance can dissuade low-income individuals, for
whom time is often scarce, from participating in such programs. Microborrowers may prefer to transact with fringe financial institutions, or the new
cyberfinancing networks that do not impose these transaction costs.100
The above-described features of domestic microfinance also limit the
potential sources of capital and investment that can be accessed to promote U.S. microenterprise. First, contributors to American MFIs must either have social motivations or desire a tax-exemption or tax credits to invest in these endeavors.101 U.S. microfinance institutions also have to
96

See Dyal-Chand, supra note 59, at 238–39.
See Microfinance FAQs, supra note 91.
98
See, e.g., Dyal-Chand, supra note 59, at 231.
99
See id. at 238–39.
100
See, e.g., Chaffee & Rapp, supra note 7, at 496; Barnett, supra note 85.
101
See Davis & Gelpern, supra note 7, at 1238 (explaining the legal features of U.S.
non-profit microfinance institutions with which donors have to comply).
97
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compete with international microfinance institutions to obtain donors.
Some donors may perceive that smaller contributions can make a greater
contribution in international microfinance markets than in American markets.102 Second, in domestic American microfinance, individual lenders also
do not make a direct connection with potential borrowers; rather, they interact and contract with intermediating non-profit organizations in the hope
that those organizations will make legitimate loans and provide valuable
training to U.S. microentrepreneurs. Third, prospective borrowers have to
be aware of existing MFIs in order to access funds. Prospective borrowers
are more likely to be aware of microfinance institutions that have a geographic presence in their neighborhoods. Thus, while American MFIs connect economically marginal and geographically isolated individuals to some
sources of credit that might not otherwise be available, they do not connect
participants to substantially new markets or social networks outside of their
geographic areas, demographic profiles, or friendship networks. Lastly, the
existing framework of offline American microfinance does not reach the
lowest income borrowers nor does it provide the kind of capital needed to
help microentrepreneurs grow and sustain their businesses over time.103 The
lowest income borrowers either cannot qualify for microfinance programs
or they do not connect with microfinancing institutions.104 Further, the
amount of money obtained by U.S. microentrepreneurs from U.S. microfinance institutions is not enough to sustain a microenterprise as it grows and
navigates an increasingly competitive and complex American market.105
Cyberfinancing, as currently operated, does not substantially overcome these
shortcomings of domestic microfinance.
D. Legal Responses to Spatial and Economic Marginality
While domestic peer financing and microfinance developed somewhat independently of formal law, Congress did enact several laws to stimulate private
investment and microenterprise in historically disadvantaged communities.

102

Press Release, Kiva.Org, Kiva Launches Online Microfinance in the United States
(June 10, 2009), available at http://www.marketwire.com/press-release/kiva-launches-on
line-microfinance-in-the-united-states-1222313.htm (“Most people think of microfinance as
something that helps people in the developing world alone, but the impact of microfinance can
be felt in any community that supports creative, industrious entrepreneurs.”).
103
See, e.g., Dyal-Chand, supra note 59, at 270; Louise A. Howells, The Dimensions
of Microenterprise: A Critical Look at Microenterprise as a Tool to Alleviate Poverty, 9
J. OF AFFORDABLE HOUS. & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 161, 171 (2000).
104
See, e.g., Dyal-Chand, supra note 59, at 270; Louise A. Howells, supra note 103, at 171.
105
See Dyal-Chand, supra note 59, at 270; Louise A. Howells, supra note 103, at 171.
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Congress enacted the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA)106 in 1977 to
end the practice of “redlining” and to stimulate private bank investment in
economically marginalized areas.107 The CRA also spurred private investment in domestic microfinance when the CRA regulations were revised in
1995,108 and when the Community Development Financial Institutions Fund
(CDFI Fund) was created in 1994.109 The CRA gives federally insured depository institutions a “continuing and affirmative obligation to help meet
the credit needs of the local communities in which they are chartered, including low- and moderate-income neighborhoods.”110 Covered banks are
encouraged to fulfill their CRA obligations in a manner “consistent with the
safe and sound operation of such institutions.”111 This requirement, as interpreted and implemented by bank regulators, encourages banks not only to end
redlining practices, but also to affirmatively seek opportunities to lend in formally redlined low- and moderate-income neighborhoods.112
The CRA’s definition of low- to moderate-income communities does
not specifically take race into account.113 Instead, it encourages banks to
remedy the geographic and economic isolation caused by historical racism
by meeting the credit needs of low- to moderate-income communities within a bank’s “assessment areas.”114 The term “assessment area” includes the
geographic locations in which the bank has its “main office, its branches,
and its deposit-taking ATMs, as well as the surrounding geographies in
which the bank has originated or purchased a substantial portion of its
loans.115 The CRA is separate from, but works in conjunction with, other
anti-discrimination laws and consumer protection laws. The CRA is enforced by four federal bank regulators.116 The regulators review a bank’s
106

See generally 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901–2908 (2000).
Marsico, Community Reinvestment Act, supra note 27, at 403–14.
108
Community Reinvestment Act Regulations, 60 Fed. Reg. § 22,156, 22,157 (May 4,
1995) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 25, 203, 228, 345, 563e).
109
The Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994,
12 U.S.C. § 4701 (1994).
110
12 U.S.C. § 2901(a)(3); see also Richard D. Marsico, Democratizing Capital: The
History, Law and Reform of the Community Reinvestment Act, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV.
717 (2004–2005) [hereinafter Marsico, Democratizing Capital].
111
12 U.S.C. § 2901(b).
112
See Marsico, Democratizing Capital, supra note 110, at 717–18.
113
See Raymond H. Brescia, A CRA for the 21st Century: Congress Considers the
Community Reinvestment Act of 2009, 28 BANK. & FIN. SERV. POL’Y REPORT 1 (2009)
[hereinafter Brescia, CRA for the 21st Century] (explaining that CRA’s provisions do not
prohibit racially discriminatory conduct).
114
12 C.F.R. § 25.21(b) (2008); see also Brescia, CRA for the 21st Century, supra
note 113, at 2 (describing the legislation’s definition of assessment areas).
115
12 C.F.R. § 25.41(c) (2003).
116
See Marsico, Democratizing Capital, supra note 110, at 718–19.
107
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determination of its assessment areas,117 and issue public written reports
that rate banks’ compliance with their CRA obligations.118 The regulators
consider a bank’s CRA rating when determining whether to grant a bank’s
application to “obtain a charter, obtain deposit insurance, establish a
branch, relocate a home office or branch, merge with another bank, or obtain the assets or assume the liabilities of another bank.”119 A negative
CRA rating can cause regulators to deny a bank permission to engage in
these activities. Any member of the public can participate in the public
comment process and oppose any bank’s application on the basis of its
CRA ratings.120
The CDFI Fund was created in 1994 as an arm of the U.S. Treasury Department, to promote economic revitalization and community development
through investment in, and assistance to, CDFIs.121 CDFIs are privately
owned financial intermediaries established to advance community economic
development in low-income and historically disadvantaged communities in
the United States.122 CDFIs provide financial services to microenterprises,
non-profit organizations, commercial real estate development projects,
affordable housing, and other community development projects in historically disinvested areas.123 The CDFI Fund directly invests in, supports,
and trains CDFIs.124 It also administers the New Markets Tax Credit Program (NMTC Program), which provides tax credits to individual and corporate investors who make equity investments in specialized financial institutions called Community Development Entities (CDEs).125 CDEs provide
investment capital to low-income communities and include members of
such communities on their governing boards.126 Many CDFIs seek CDE
certification to attract private investment for microfinance and other community development activities. In 1995, revised CRA regulations explicitly recognized loans and investments made by regulated private banks in
CDFIs as qualified CRA activities.127 By investing in CDFIs that screen
117

See Brescia, CRA for the 21st Century, supra note 113, at 2.
See id.
119
Marsico, Community Reinvestment Act, supra note 27, at 406.
120
See id. at 719.
121
About the CDFI Fund, COMMUNITY DEV. FIN. INST. FUND, http://www.cdfifund
.gov/who_we_are/about_us.asp (last updated Jan. 31, 2013).
122
See id.
123
Overview of What We Do, COMMUNITY DEV. FIN. FUND, http://www.cdfifund.gov
/what_we_do/overview.asp (last updated Oct. 12, 2011).
124
See About the CDFI Fund, COMMUNITY DEV. FIN. INST. FUND, supra note 121.
125
New Markets Tax Credit Act, 26 U.S.C. § 45D (2012).
126
See id. at § 45D.
127
These regulations also established a three-part test for large banks “with [a] 50
percent weighted on lending, 25 percent on community development investments, and 25
118
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microfinance institutions, which ultimately screen borrowers, private
banks reduce the transaction costs associated with investing in marginal
communities. They can also obtain a favorable CRA rating from these activities, which helps them maximize profits in other aspects of their business. This confluence of federal laws and regulations helped stimulate private sector investment in microfinance and community development.
However, the CRA, the CDFI, and the NMTC are all examples of federal legislation designed to stimulate economic development in communities that are defined geographically—the neighborhood, low- and moderate-income areas, the metropolitan statistical area, the qualified census
tract, and the assessment area, amongst other designations. Yet, as globalization and technology operate to disentangle markets from geographic
boundaries, some of the traditional legal structures and community development practices that remedy prior market failures and facilitate new economic development may need to be reexamined, or at least applied in new
contexts. The geographic emphasis of these laws is still necessary, but,
perhaps no longer sufficient. A diverse range of financial institutions, in
complex economic relationships, now provide banking and financial services. With the advent of the Internet and interactive websites, increasingly, markets and economic opportunities are less tied to local geographic
boundaries. Geography is not irrelevant and globalization and technology
still have implications for local markets, but new banking and economic
development opportunities exist in cyberspace, rather than in geographic
space. Our community economic development laws and economic justice
incentives must respond to this increasing complexity.
E. Modernizing the Community Reinvestment Act to Respond to Changes
in the Financial Services Delivery System
The recent subprime mortgage debacle exemplifies how community
economic development laws and incentives need to be modernized128 and
expanded to respond to changing economic conditions. While the subprime
mortgage crisis was not caused by innovations in cyberspace, it demonstrates that CRA’s protections did not keep pace with significant changes in
percent on retail (i.e., branch locations), and community development services (e.g.,
financial education).” Mark Willis, It’s the Rating Stupid: A Bankers Perspective on the
CRA, in REVISITING THE CRA: PERSPECTIVES ON THE FUTURE OF THE CMTY. REINVESTMENT
ACT 59–69 (2009) (smaller banks with less than $250 million were only subject to the
fifty percent lending test).
128
See John Moon, CRA Modernization and Impact Investments, 2010 CMTY. DEV.
INV. REV. (FED. RESERVE BANK OF SAN FRANCISCO) 50–54 (2010).
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the financial services industry spurred by bank deregulation and capital
market innovations. This regulatory slippage had a negative impact on the
mortgage industry in general, but also on and low-income, minority, economically marginal and geographically isolated communities, in particular.
When the CRA was initially enacted, its covered depository institutions
originated most of the mortgages in the United States, and held most household savings in the United States.129 At that time, individuals’ also conducted most of their banking through local bank branches. Fixed-rate, prime,
thirty-year mortgages were also the norm for most Americans.
In the 1980s, the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary
Control Act of 1980 (DIDMCA),130 the Alternative Mortgage Transaction
Parity Act of 1982 (AMTPA),131 and their accompanying implementing
regulations deregulated the mortgage industry.132 DIDMCA preempted
state interest rate caps on mortgages.133 The AMTPA enabled lenders to
offer adjustable rate mortgages.134 This deregulation enabled mortgage
companies to offer more complex products with complicated terms, such
as adjustable rate mortgages with teaser rates, mortgages with balloon
payments, and mortgages containing higher interest rates and fees.135 Further, in 1999, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA), also known as the
“Financial Services Modernization Act,” made significant changes to the
financial services industry, eliminating many regulatory barriers that prevented banks, securities firms, and insurance companies from affiliating.136 The GLBA allowed banks, securities firms, and insurance companies to consolidate within a financial holding company.137 These financial
holding companies provided a range of financial services at lower costs.138
This deregulation and other changes in the financial services industry led
129
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See id. at 166.
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to a proliferation of mortgage companies that offered a range of complicated financial products that were not regulated by the CRA. While legislators sought to repeal the CRA in their deliberations over the GBLA, the
CRA was maintained although modified.139 Applications by financial holding companies and national banks seeking new financial services or to acquire new companies must be denied where any of the holding companies’
banks or thrifts has a low CRA rating.140 However, “where a parent company’s depository institutions all have CRA ratings of at least satisfactory,
such applications cannot be denied on CRA grounds.”141 The GLBA also
relaxed the CRA burden on mid-sized banks.142 These changes led to lax
enforcement of CRA protections and left the activities of some mortgage
companies outside of the regulatory ambit of the CRA.143 This failure to
modernize and expand CRA’s protections created a regulatory vacuum
that contributed to the crisis.144 Unscrupulous mortgage brokers originated
subprime mortgages with problematic terms to unwitting borrowers and
engaged in predatory lending in the same communities once previously
redlined.145 Studies have shown that subprime lenders often engaged in
“reverse redlining”— targeting predatory and subprime loans with problematic terms towards minority borrowers, who may not qualify for prime
loans or who are inexperienced in mortgage markets.146 Other studies reveal that subprime and predatory lenders targeted some minority borrowers
who otherwise would have qualified for prime loans.147 While risky loans
were initially marketed primarily to low-income, minority communities,
and to seniors, the failure to regulate these practices legitimized irresponsible lending practices. Consequently, a growing number of institutions
offered these products to individuals living outside of vulnerable, lowincome, minority communities, and a growing number of individuals sought
139
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or used these products to obtain new sources of income and equity. Thus,
relatively few subprime loans even qualified for CRA credit, either because they “were made outside of CRA assessment areas, or because they
were made to higher-income borrowers.”148 A study conducted by the U.S.
Federal Reserve found that “only 6% of all higher-priced loans in 2006
[the height of the subprime mortgage crisis] were made by CRA-covered
institutions or their affiliates to lower-income borrowers or neighborhoods
in their assessment areas.”149
Mainstream banks could indirectly finance subprime lending through
relationships with non-affiliated financial institutions not covered by
CRA. Further, “census tracts served disproportionately by CRA-covered
lenders had less risky loans and lower delinquency rates than those served
disproportionately by non-CRA lenders.”150 Despite these facts, many
have identified the CRA as the primary or sole cause of subprime and
predatory lending in the United States.151 Instead, the subprime mortgage
catastrophe demonstrates that CRA’s protections did not keep pace with
significant changes in the financial services industry spurred by bank deregulation and capital market innovations. Deregulation in the securities
and financial services industries also increased the securitization of subprime mortgages. Securitization created increased demand for subprime
products that could be sold to investors.152 The majority of originators, and
the majority of special purpose vehicles that securitized subprimemortgage products, were not CRA covered depository institutions. These
organizations conducted their financial activities outside the ambit of CRA
regulators. These entities were, thus, given free rein to engage in irresponsible
lending practices, and to market problematic products to individuals and
communities that were vulnerable as a result of their economic, social or
geographic status. This regulatory slippage also created market opportunities for fringe financial institutions153 and unscrupulous lenders to locate
in, and target, low-income minority neighborhoods.154 These institutions
148
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predominated in low-income, minority communities, because of those
communities’ histories of disinvestment and their lack of legitimate financial alternatives.155 While these fringe banking156 institutions’ ultimately
raise customers’ transaction costs in the long-run, in the short-term, they
reduce the transaction costs associated with obtaining cash. Thus, unregulated, fringe financial services are initially efficient for all involved. Lowincome, minority, and geographically isolated borrowers may prefer to
transact with fringe financial institutions because they can obtain cash
quickly without having to endure credit checks, training or other financial
and non-financial requirements of mainstream financial institutions and
microfinance agencies.157 Yet, fringe financial services markets are also
characterized by opportunism and abuses of trust.158 A lack of consistent
national regulations to facilitate legitimate lending in low-income communities and to curb fraudulent, unfair, and deceptive practices helped to create an alternative market space that undermined trust and limited access to
legitimate mainstream markets. This example of regulatory drift demonstrates that a lack of regulation can lead markets to develop in dysfunctional ways that perpetuate existing market failures and replicate existing
social allocations of power. Problematic distributive outcomes in markets
can occur when law is inattentive to the relationship between communities
and markets. Hence, the United States may also need to modernize the CRA
to regulate new developments in the financial services delivery system, such
as new online cyberfinancing, and to ensure distributive justice in these
emerging markets.
II. CYBERFINANCING 2.0: COMMUNITIES, MARKETS AND LAW REVISITED
A. Online Peer-to-Peer Lending 2.0
Online P2P lending describes interactive websites that allow borrowers
and lenders to transact with one another online without the traditional involvement of a mainstream financial institution.159 Some scholars call P2P
lending an example of continued disintermediation in lending transactions,
Shrewd Business or Predatory Lending, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1 (2002) (describing payday
loans as “extremely high-interest, short-term loans offered to cash strapped consumers”).
155
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suggesting that borrowers and lenders can increasingly engage in lending
transactions without the intermediating role of a bank or financial institution.160 Yet, as this Section explains, while P2P lending platforms eliminate
some of the traditional intermediating functions of banks, they still intermediate, albeit in a unique way. These platforms not only intermediate differently
from traditional banks, but they also intermediate differently than traditional
microfinance institutions or ROSCAs.
The three most popular P2P lending platforms in the United States are
Prosper.com (Prosper), Lending Club.com (Lending Club) and Kiva.org
(Kiva).161 Prosper and Lending Club are P2P lending platforms owned by
two different for-profit companies. Kiva is a P2P microlending platform,
owned by a non-profit organization, which enables lenders to make interest-free loans to microentrepreneurs throughout the globe.162 The forprofit lending platforms primarily facilitate unsecured loans between borrowers and lenders. The non-profit platform facilitates domestic and international microlending. These platforms help borrowers and lenders, identify each other, connect, lend, and borrow online. They also enable users to
connect across distance, class, race, gender, and ethnicity.
Notably, online P2P lending increased in popularity, in the United States,
along with more famous social networking sites such as Facebook and
YouTube.163 P2P lending also became an increasingly important alternative
source of consumer credit in the United States, as credit markets contracted after the financial crisis and during the Great Recession.164 In 2009, for
example, U.S. banks posted the sharpest declines in private lending since
1942.165 In response, many borrowers turned to online P2P lending. When
the for-profit P2P platforms were initially launched, they allowed borrowers with lower credit scores than those required by mainstream financial
institutions to publish loan requests on P2P lending sites.166 This enabled
economically marginal and geographically isolated borrowers to obtain
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loans on terms that were otherwise difficult for them to obtain through traditional or even fringe financial markets.167
Yet, as the SEC began to regulate these websites,168 Prosper and Lending Club adopted higher minimum credit scores for qualifying borrowers.
These requirements will operate to limit traditionally marginalized borrowers’ access to these websites. This example shows how SEC regulation
led the for-profit P2P lending sites to limit marginalized borrowers’ access. It suggests that the United States should embrace a multi-agency and
multidisciplinary approach to regulating P2P lending that balances the
needs of both lenders and borrowers who participate on these sites. In Part
III, this Article proposes such a regulatory structure. The following Sections describe and analyze the premiere for-profit and non-profit P2P lending platforms in the United States. Section 1 of Part II.A describes the forprofit P2P lending process and the intermediary organizations that facilitate it. Section 1 of Part II.A also explains that U.S. regulators are increasingly restricting economically marginal borrowers’ access to these websites. Section 2 of Part II.A describes how the non-profit P2P microlendmicrolending platform, Kiva.org, intermediates in P2P microlending
transactions online. It also outlines the advantages and disadvantages of
the current model of non-profit P2P lending for geographically isolated
and economically marginal borrowers.
1. For-Profit Peer-to-Peer Lending 2.0
Prosper and Lending Club have similar lending processes. Potential
borrowers and lenders must register on the P2P lending platforms and
provide basic information to the platforms “to determine their eligibility as
a borrower or lender.”169 Prospective borrowers have more stringent requirements for eligibility than prospective lenders. They must complete a
loan application to determine their creditworthiness, and must now have
minimum credit scores of “at least 640 for Prosper and 660 for Lending
Club” to participate.170 Prosper and Lending Club then assign letter grades
to help prospective lenders gauge borrowers’ creditworthiness.171 The letter grades are based upon a combination of the borrower’s credit score,
credit history, requested loan amount, and past delinquencies.172 Both
167
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companies then post approved and rated loan requests for lenders to review and select.173 Prospective lenders, however, are not evaluated for
creditworthiness.174 They only have to provide identity verification and
attest that they meet the platforms’, or various state regulators’, minimum
asset requirements.175
These platforms allow borrowers to develop, and publish online, once
approved, personal narratives that provide non-financial information about
the borrower and his or her loan request. Prospective lenders can view this
information, in addition to standard financial information, when making
lending decisions. Recent studies have shown that this narrative information
can make a difference in lenders’ decision-making processes.176 Borrowers
whose credit grades are poor will often “strategically provide identities”177
in this narrative section. The identities that borrowers develop through these
narratives can positively influence a lender’s decision to lend to a borrower
with an otherwise poor credit rating.178 Thus, users on P2P lending platforms may not know each other before meeting and connecting online, but
they come to know a bit more about each other, in this cyberspace, through
the information that the P2P lending platforms collect and publish. In making their determinations, lenders can manually peruse individual loan requests, develop portfolios based upon certain criteria, or use automated
portfolio building tools offered by the platforms to make their selections.179
The platforms also limit the aggregate amount that each lender can
lend—up to $5 million dollars for Prosper and no more than ten percent of a
lender’s total net worth for Lending Club. Both platforms provide participating lenders “a prorated share of any corresponding repayments of principal and interest on the loans they help fund.”180 These platforms, therefore,
provide lenders returns on their investments.181 If the borrowers associated
with the lenders’ investments fail to repay their loans, however, lenders will
lose both their principal and interest investments.182 These platforms enable
lenders to achieve higher returns on their investments.183
173
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As of March 31, 2011 Prosper reported that lenders received average
annualized returns exceeding 11 percent for loans originated since it
completed registration with the SEC in July 2009, while Lending Club
reported net annualized returns exceeding 9 percent for all loans since it
issued its first loan in June 2007.184

These returns exceeded those annual yields available on savings, money market accounts, and certificates of deposit during the same period.185
Borrowers use these platforms as alternative sources of credit.186 Borrowers on these platforms are usually seeking “small unsecured loans for
consumer purposes—such as consolidating debts, paying for home repairs,
or financing personal, household or family purchases—or to a lesser extent for business purposes.”187 Some economically marginalized borrowers
“for whom payday lending may have been the only option,” have turned to
P2P markets to “consolidate their loans, pay off debts, and improve their
credit scores.”188 The interest rates on P2P loans are often lower than those
on traditional unsecured bank loans or credit cards.189 “As of March 31,
2011, the annual percentage rate for a 3-year loan was as low as 6.9 percent for Prosper and 6.8 percent for Lending Club, depending on the borrower’s credit ratings or loan grades, while the average annual percentage
rate for credit cards around that time was 14.7 percent.”190 While Prosper’s
annual percentage rates can be as high as 35.6 percent and Lending Club’s
can be as high as 25.4 percent, “Prosper reported that the average annual percentage rate for all 3-year loans since its inception was 20.6 percent, and
Lending Club reported that the same average for its loans was 11.4 percent.”191
A lender will usually invest in a number of different loans, and may
invest in all or part of a given loan request, to diversify its portfolio of investments.192 Some lenders may give as little as $25 per loan.193 Notably,
lenders on both platforms do not make loans directly to borrowers.194
Thus, the platforms do intermediate between borrowers and lenders. When
184
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lenders choose borrowers through the P2P lending platforms, they purchase payment-dependent notes from the platforms that correspond to the
selected borrower loans.195 WebBank, an FDIC-insured Utah-chartered
industrial bank, issues the loans to borrowers, and then sells and assigns
the loans to the respective platforms in exchange for the principal amount
that the platforms received from the sale of corresponding notes to the
lenders.196 Thus, the WebBank originates the loans, but does not retain
ownership of the loans. Instead, the WebBank transfers the loans and the
risk of borrower nonpayment to the respective platforms.197
The platforms now are registered with the SEC and sell their notes to
lenders via prospectus.198 Those notes are the platforms’ obligations payable upon borrower repayment.199 “Accordingly, when the lender signals
interest in a prospective borrower, and WebBank lends to the borrower,
the platform permanently retains ownership of the borrower’s indebtedness. The platform then sells its debt instrument to the lender, who becomes a creditor of the platform not the borrower.”200 Prosper and Lending Club retain exclusive rights to service the loans, collect monthly
payments from borrowers, and recover any delinquencies.201 They also
determine when to turn over delinquent loans to third-party collection
agencies.202 The platforms take a one percent servicing fee, amongst other
fees, and then “credit each lender’s account with his or her share of the
remaining funds.”203 For both companies, as of March 31, 2011, about two
percent or less of the loans in their top three credit grades originated between the first half of 2010 had defaulted.204
The P2P lending platforms described above provide a slightly more
individualized way for lenders to identify prospective borrowers.205 As
explained earlier, standard banks and lending institutions, including payday lenders, use more “standardized underwriting procedures and risk profiling algorithms”206 to determine borrowers’ creditworthiness and to guide
195
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their lending decisions. Using these methods, “[b]orrowers with more standard risk profiles have better access to credit than those that fall outside of
traditional parameters.”207 Thus, traditional standardized underwriting can
lead to a credit rationing that precludes riskier or economically marginal
borrowers, from receiving credit.208 While the P2P lending platforms’ consideration of credit scores and determination of letter grades constitute a
form of credit rationing, the platforms also collect, and allow borrowers to
provide, other nonfinancial information as part of their customized loan listing, such as what the loan will be used for, a borrower’s description of their
financial situation, and an explanation of delinquencies, or a high-revolving
credit balance.209 This additional information may help economically marginal borrowers whose economic indicators suggest credit risk convince individual lenders to consider them despite their economic risk factors.210
Lenders also often fund more than one loan and aggregate loans. Consequently, lenders may be willing to fund some riskier borrowers if that risk is
offset by more standard borrowers. Thus, while online P2P lending does not
eliminate the barriers to credit access that high-risk borrowers face, it can mitigate them by reducing the costs associated with lending transactions, and
overcoming, in part, the geographic and social distance that precludes traditionally marginalized borrowers from participation in mainstream markets.
For-profit online P2P lending platforms also expose economically marginal and geographically isolated borrowers to a broader selection of potential lenders than traditional microfinance institutions, or ROSCAs. Prospective lenders on Prosper and Lending Club are, generally, seeking to obtain
better financial returns on their investments, than what might be available
through other investment vehicles. As such, investors on these sites are not
primarily motivated to assist low-income individuals or groups. Thus, economically marginal borrowers participating on these sites are exposed to a
broader social network of potential lenders than would be available through
a community-based ROSCA or through microfinance institutions. Marginalized borrowers may also prefer to obtain small amounts of unsecured
loans from individuals through P2P lending platforms; this is because they
can escape the time-consuming and costly process of community meetings,
2009-06, 2009), available at http://www.frbsf.org/publications/community/wpapers/2009
/wp2009-06.pdf.
207
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as well as the peer-pressure that characterizes participation in informal
ROSCAs or formal microfinance institutions.211
P2P lending platforms, therefore, provided borrowers with new sources
of credit and investors with new opportunities to lend their capital, and diversify their investments, by reducing the transaction and information costs
associated with lending through traditional financial institutions.212 However, P2P lending platforms now only collect limited non-financial information about borrowers and they do not facilitate the same level of faceto-face interaction and trust-building as do ROSCAs and microfinance institutions. As a result, for-profit P2P lending institutions may not help borrowers establish the tight social bonds and human capital development essential to helping borrowers repay and develop their microenterprises.
Another risk is that borrowers, who are inexperienced, may not be able to
determine good credit terms. Further, ROSCAs and microfinance institutions attempt somewhat to align the interests of borrowers and lenders by
making individuals play both roles, or by requiring borrowers to attend
financial and business education seminars that increase the likelihood of
repayment. For-profit P2P lending portals do not require borrowers and
lenders to align their interests, nor do they force borrowers and lenders to
engage in repeat transactions. While this may lower the transaction costs
for borrowers and lenders, it may also heighten the risks of non-payment
or fraud in online transactions.
P2P lending still represents an opportunity for geographically isolated
and economically marginalized borrowers to access new sources of credit
by connecting them more directly to new sources of funds. Yet, current
U.S. regulation of P2P lending is restricting traditionally marginalized actors’ access to these markets. In response to some defaults, but also in response to increased regulatory scrutiny, the leading platforms now require
higher minimum credit scores for prospective borrowers, than they required when the platforms were first launched. These higher credit score
requirements are designed to protect lenders because they connect lenders
to less risky borrowers. While lenders do need protection in these markets,
US regulators may need to create incentives that increase marginalized
actors access without sacrificing the rights of lenders.
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a. SEC Regulation of P2P Lending Restricts Marginalized
Borrowers’ Access
Given the novel and complex nature of P2P lending transactions, a
number of federal and state agencies have responsibility for regulating these
transactions.213 As scholars have noted, because WebBank, an FDICinsured institution, is involved in the process of intermediation, a number of
federal banking and lending statutes apply to these transactions.214 Thus,
lenders who might discriminate against low-income and geographically
marginal borrowers based upon illegitimate criteria, such as race, gender
or ethnic status, are prohibited from such activities by federal antidiscrimination laws that pertain to lending transactions. Further, consumer
protection statutes that apply to lending activities such as the Truth in
Lending Act (TILA), the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), the Fair Debt
Collections Practices Act (FDCPA), the Electronic Funds Transfer Act
(EFTA), and section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA) also
apply to P2P lending transactions.215 These statutes, however, do not address the geographic and economic barriers to credit access that often
plague traditionally marginalized groups. Thus, the consumer and antidiscrimination focus of existing lending laws are necessary, but are unlikely
to address the economic, geographic, and social isolation that precludes
many borrowers from participating in mainstream markets.
Notably, the SEC has been the most aggressive agency in regulating
P2P lending.216 This may explain the investor-protection emphasis in the
U.S.’s current regulation of P2P lending. In 2008, the SEC issued a ceaseand-desist order against Prosper because it determined that the lending
notes Prosper issued to investors constituted securities under federal securities laws.217 Since Prosper had not registered with the SEC prior to the
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cease-and-desist order, the SEC determined that it was dealing unregistered
securities in violation of sections 5(a) and (c) of the Securities Act of 1933.218
Notably, federal securities laws do not precisely define the term “securities,”
yet based upon the Supreme Court’s precedents in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.
and Reves v. Ernst & Young, interpreting the Securities Act of 1933, the SEC
determined that Prosper was trading unregistered securities and ordered Prosper to cease its activities.219
In Howey, the Supreme Court devised a test to determine whether a
particular transaction qualifies as an “investment contract,” or security,
and held that “a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person [i] invests his money [ii] in a common enterprise and is led to expect [iii] profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third-party,” constitutes an
investment contract and is thus subject to U.S. securities regulation.220 The
SEC determined that the payment-dependent notes issued to investors by
Prosper satisfied all three elements of the Howey test and constituted an
investment contract subject to securities regulation.221 Further, the SEC
found that Prosper’s notes constituted securities under the tests established
by the Supreme Court in Reves v. Ernest & Young.222 In Reves, the Supreme Court devised a list of factors to identify which notes do not constitute
securities.223 Since the payment-dependent notes issued to lenders through
Prosper did not qualify under any of the factors in the Reves list, the SEC
also determined that Prosper’s notes were securities.224 Prosper shut down
in 2008, in response to the SEC’s cease and desist order and resumed operation on July 13, 2009 after filing a registration statement with the
SEC.225 Lending Club then also shut down its notes operation in 2008
pending registration with the SEC, “but it continued to make loans to borrowers using its own funds.”226 Lending Club resumed its notes operation
investors consider the loans investments, and there is no other regulator to protect investors
against risks).
218
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219
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in October 2008 and grew rapidly.227 As of March 31, 2011, Prosper and
Lending Club facilitated about 63,000 unsecured, fixed-term, and fixedrate loans, totaling approximately $469 million, most of which were consumer loans.228
The SEC’s effort to regulate the industry created barriers to entry for
economically marginal and geographically isolated borrowers. Around the
time of increased scrutiny by the SEC, Prosper increased its minimum required credit score to 640.229 Lending Club began increasing its minimum
credit score requirements in 2007 as a way to help build lender confidence, and to respond to increased scrutiny by the SEC.230 Prosper’s and
Lending Club’s required credit scores of 640 and 660, respectively, are
substantially higher than domestic microfinance institutions require.231 If
economically marginal and geographically isolated borrowers can meet
these credit requirements, then they may be able to obtain some loans on
these platforms, yet those amounts will not help such borrowers fully
overcome their economic marginalization. Commentators have also noted
that Prosper appears to be “evolving from a comprehensive market toward
a market that primarily serves borrowers who have traditional access to
credit.”232 Additionally, because the SEC has been the most aggressive
regulator of for-profit P2P lending, thus far, borrowers’ risks are relegated
to the protection of existing consumer protection laws.
b. The GAO’s Recommendations for Regulating P2P Lending Are
Inadequate to Enhance Marginalized Actors’ Access
The Government Accountability Office’s (GAO) report233 on the status
of the P2P lending industry included a performance audit of the industry
227
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See id. at 1.
229
Chaffee & Rapp, supra note 7, at 494.
230
See Galloway, supra note 206, at 12 (“As a way to help build confidence on the
lenders’ side, we have decided to limit access to borrowers with at least a 640 FICO score
and less than 20% debt-to-income ratio .... The flip side is that we have to turn down a
fair number of borrowers.”) (quoting Allan Stern, Interview of Renaud Leplanche on
August 6, 2007).
231
Compare GAO REPORT, supra note 10, at 10–12, with Erica Dorn, U.S. Microfinance 101, KIVA FELLOWS BLOG (Apr. 27, 2009), http://fellowsblog.kiva.org/2009/04/27
/usmicrofinance-101/#comments.
232
Galloway, supra note 206, at 12 (quoting Seth Freedman & Ginger Zhe Jin,
Dynamic Learning and Selection: The Early Years of Prosper.com 7 (Univ. of Md. Dep’t of
Econ., Working Paper, June 20, 2008), available at http://www.prosper.com/downloads
/research/dynamic-learning-selection-062008.pdf).
233
GAO REPORT, supra note 10, at 2.
228

346

WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 4:309

from August 2010 to July 2011.234 The report identifies two primary regulatory options for P2P lending that distinctly emphasize lender protection.235
First, it suggests that the United States could continue “with the current bifurcated federal system—that is, protecting lenders through securities regulation
and borrowers primarily through financial services regulators, which will include the new [Consumer Financial Protection Bureau] CFPB—or ... consolidating borrower and lender protection under a single federal regulator, such
as CFPB.”236 Neither of these regulatory options addresses the operational
risk that the contracts, policies, and practices of the P2P lending intermediaries may limit low-income and traditionally marginalized borrowers’ participation in this market. The GAO’s suggestion that borrowers should be
relegated to the existing consumer protection framework, or to the newly
established CFPB, is therefore inadequate. This Article asserts that increased SEC regulation primarily protects investors and lenders and restricts
economically marginalized borrowers’ access to these markets. This Article
also contends that the GAO’s proposed regulation of P2P markets is not designed to expand economically marginalized borrowers’ access; and thereby
fails to substantially advance distributive justice in these markets.
Both the U.S. securities law regime and the U.S. consumer protection
law regime privilege disclosure as the primary mechanism to protect investors’ and consumers’ interests in economic markets. Disclosure alone,
however, will not address the institutional, economic, communal, and geographic reasons why historically marginalized and geographically isolated individuals may have difficulty accessing and benefiting from P2P
markets. Since economically marginal and geographically isolated individuals have not had access to traditional American markets, they may not exhibit
the same rational economic actor decision-making behavior upon which disclosure laws are based. Further, while the federal anti-discrimination laws that
apply to P2P lending may address individualized instances of blatant discrimination in P2P lending transactions, they do not address the historical legacy
of group harms, nor how individuals’ geographic locations, as well as their
economic, racial, and ethnic circumstances, may affect whether they can access these markets. Thus, the Dodd Frank Act’s two suggested regulatory
options are insufficient to address the access-to-credit risks that may plague
users of for-profit P2P markets.
In sum, while these P2P lending platforms offer borrowers and lenders
the possibility of significant financial returns and greater access to credit,
234
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the U.S.’s current, and proposed, approach to regulating P2P lending is not
designed to help economically marginalized and geographically isolated
market participants fully realize the benefits of these markets. For those
historically marginalized individuals who can access these markets, it is an
open question if the trust between individuals, that was abused by subprime mortgage brokers and lenders and which is essential to face-to-face
peer lending, and domestic microfinance, is present in online P2P, and can
therefore, can help economically marginal and geographically isolated
borrowers obtain new legitimate sources of financing. Perhaps U.S. regulators should create incentives for these P2P platforms to develop policies that
will enhance economically marginalized and geographically isolated actors’
access, while still maintaining policies that reduce fraud in these transactions.
2. Non-Profit Peer-to-Peer Lending and Microfinance 2.0
Kiva.org is a microfinance P2P lending platform operated by Kiva Microfunds (Kiva), a 501(c)(3) non-profit organization located in California.237
Notably, Kiva reports that 81.54% of its borrowers are women, and most of
those women borrowers are from developing countries.238 Kiva launched, in
June of 2009, a fledgling U.S. market working with established U.S. microfinance institutions.239 Kiva currently works with seven U.S. microfinance
institutions that fund only low-income microentrepreneurs within the United
States.240 Many of these institutions are the same microfinance institutions
described in Part I.B of this Article. Kiva calls its microfinance partner
organizations field partners.241 “As of March 31, 2011, about 570,000 Kiva
lenders had funded approximately $200 million for 273,000 microloans
across 59 countries.”242 During the same time period, Kiva reported that
each of its lenders funds an average of approximately eleven loans for
about $380 per borrower.243 Lenders can fund part of a microloan for as
little as $25, or they can fund an entire loan.244 Loans requested by Kiva
borrowers can range from $1200 to as much as $10,000.245 Kiva uses the
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third-party payment system, PayPal, to collect and transfer lender funds.246
Notably, like the for-profit platforms, Kiva does not directly connect borrowers and lenders, yet it performs a unique intermediating function in
microfinance transactions. “Kiva facilitates the collection and transfer of
capital for interest-free loans, funded by its lenders to approximately 130
microfinance institutions around the world to fund-interest bearing loans to
entrepreneurs in their communities.”247
While Kiva provides prospective lenders with information about microentrepreneurs in various countries, the loan funds contributed by lenders do
not go directly to individual microborrowers.248 Instead, “Kiva aggregates
funds from lenders and forwards them to microfinance organizations, which
make and manage loans to the borrowers and transmit the repayments to
Kiva, which in turn distributes the lenders’ shares of the funds received
back to the lenders.”249 Thus, loan proceeds from one lender do not directly
go to their chosen microborrower.250 In fact, the loans are often distributed
to microentrepreneurs by Kiva’s participating microfinance institutions “before the loan details are even posted on Kiva’s website for lenders to
view.”251 Instead, Kiva’s aggregate loan proceeds will replenish the microfinance institutions for loans that they made previously to borrowers who
are similarly situated to the ones Kiva marketed to entice a particular lender.252
Because Kiva facilitates interest-free loans, Kiva lenders do not receive
a return on their investment, although they receive repayments of principal.253 If a borrower fails to make a loan payment, the microfinance field
partner notifies Kiva, and Kiva determines if the lender should receive a late
or partial payment or no payment at all.254 If microborrowers on Kiva fail to
repay their loans, lenders will lose their principal, but not any interest.255
Thus, the SEC determined that Kiva’s loans are not securities because,
although Kiva provides lenders a return of principal, it does not give lenders the opportunity to earn interest.256 While lenders provide interest-free
246
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loans and cannot achieve returns on their investments, the microfinance
institutions that ultimately make the loans to microborrowers do charge
the microborrowers interest on their loans to cover operating costs.257 The
amount each microfinance field partner charges its borrowers differs, yet Kiva reported that as of “January 7, 2010, 35 percent is the Average Interest
Rate and Fees Borrowers Pay (Porfolio Yield) to All Kiva Field Partners.”258
However, Kiva’s international or foreign microfinance partners generally
charge more to borrowers than Kiva’s U.S. domestic microfinance partners,
who charge interests rates that typically range from twelve to nine percent.259
While Kiva’s platform poses less financial risks for lenders than the
for-profit P2P platforms, Kiva’s platform does present some unique financial and operational risks. One financial risk is that Kiva’s selected borrowers will fail to repay their loans. Kiva does not guarantee its lenders’
loans, so it, therefore, it transfers the risk of nonpayment to the lender.260
However, given Kiva’s reported repayment rates this risk is very small.261
Another risk is that Kiva will fail, in its role as intermediator, to obtain
repayments from its field partners. Once again, given Kiva’s reported repayment rates, this does not appear to be a problem. Kiva could also become insolvent or also engage in some kind of fraud. Yet, since Kiva is a
501(c)(3) organization, U.S. federal and state charities regulation should
minimize the likelihood of these risks. Yet, there have been no reports
about Kiva’s institutional capacity.
The greatest operational risk to Kiva lenders is that Kiva will fail, as
an intermediator, to identify field partners and borrowers consistent with
the social objectives its lenders’ are seeking to further when making their
contributions. Kiva retains the responsibility of identifying, screening, and
rating all its microfinance field partners. Those field partners may fail in
their role by identifying microborrowers who cannot repay, making loans
to borrowers on problematic or usurious terms, using abusive techniques
to get borrowers to repay, or engaging in other unfair and deceptive practices.262 Kiva’s end-user license agreements absolve the organization of
liability for its field partners’ failures.263 While the United States’ consum257
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er protection, usury, and charities laws may deter Kiva’s U.S. microfinance
field partners from harmful and fraudulent activities, the laws against such
activities in other countries vary and can be more lax. Thus, this risk is not
as great in the United States as in other countries. Yet in its U.S. efforts,
Kiva relies on the existing domestic microfinance network, thereby mitigating the promise that online P2P lending holds for connecting borrowers to
substantially new social and financing networks. Kiva eliminated its prior
practice of allowing lenders to choose borrowers directly.264 Now Kiva
chooses the microfinance partners, who choose the borrowers.265 This intermediation somewhat limits the opportunity for direct connection between the wealthy and poor that a P2P network could allow. As discussed
later, the P2P platform allows lenders to form lending groups, but that allows for further segmentation of lenders into existing interest groups,
thereby diminishing P2P lending’s promise for geographically isolated
groups to access new lenders outside of their immediate geographic or interest groups.
Another key risk to Kiva borrowers is that lenders will prefer foreign
rather than American microborrowers because of a perception that microborrowers in developing countries are in greater need of funding or that
smaller donations will go further in developing countries. While it is true
that American microborrowers require slightly higher loan amounts because of the higher costs of business operation in the United States,266 these facts belie the reality that historically disadvantaged and geographically
isolated groups in the United States can still be economically marginalized
from new markets due to their social, racial, ethnic, and class status. Kiva
donors may be unaware of the history of geographic and economic marginalization outlined in previous Sections of this Article. As a result, Kiva’s contracts, policies, and practices may not encourage lenders to consider U.S. markets, thereby undermining the utility of online P2P lending
for traditionally marginalized groups in the United States. Kiva has only
identified seven U.S.-based microfinance field partners out of a total of
154 field partners.267 This fact suggests that while Kiva is a U.S.-based
and incorporated microfinance P2P lending platform, it may not order its
cyberspace in a way that maximizes the benefits of its market for historically marginalized groups in the United States.
264
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B. Crowdfunding 2.0
Crowdfunding is another emerging cyberfinancing market that represents a new opportunity for historically disadvantaged groups and individuals to access capital. Scholars and industry experts generally define
crowdfunding as an approach to raising capital for new enterprises by soliciting financial contributions online from a large number of contributors,
at once, through an open call for funds.268 Crowdfunding is distinct from
P2P lending in that crowdfunding enables one individual to connect with
many individuals at one time online, rather than merely connecting one
individual to another. However, many P2P lending intermediaries increasingly consider themselves part of a larger crowdfunding industry, and they
are adapting their lending practices to the crowdfunding model. The term
crowdfunding, which describes an emerging and evolving industry, derives from the term crowdsourcing.269 Author Jeff Howe apparently coined
the term crowdsourcing in a 2006 Wired Magazine article describing the
emerging phenomenon of information and ideas solicited and generated by
groups through open calls on Web 2.0 social networking sites.270 An individual or organization seeking a new idea, or a solution to a long-standing
problem, can post their need for information on these sites and receive
real-time, free responses from large numbers of individuals or organizations located anywhere. Contributors may receive a reward, or financial
compensation, for their ideas, or they may voluntarily contribute solutions
and ideas with no reward. Just as outsourcing helps companies reduce
their fixed labor costs by finding cheaper labor abroad,271 crowdsourcing
helps individuals and enterprises reduce the costs of obtaining ideas and
information because they do not have to hire and pay employees, or independent contractors, and they can reduce the costs of transmitting and obtaining information through these sites.272
Crowdfunding also enables individuals and groups to bypass the costs
and difficulties of obtaining money from investors, traditional banks, or even
fringe financial institutions by using crowdfunding intermediary financial
268
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portals. Crowdfunding became increasingly important as the health of the
U.S. economy declined during and after the Great Recession. Most entrepreneurs and individuals seeking capital for new startup enterprises or innovative ideas were resigned to government small business loans, cashstrapped domestic microfinancing programs, wealthy accredited investors,
venture capital funds, or angel investors.273 Notably, with the exception of
microfinance programs and government small business lending, these
types of investors decline ninety-five percent of all business plans they
receive.274 Lower income borrowers and entrepreneurs have even fewer
options to obtain capital for their endeavors.275 Hence, crowdfunding represents a new opportunity for marginalized individuals and groups to access capital outside of their traditional geographic, familial, or social networks. The organizations that develop crowdfunding portals act as crowdcrowdfunding intermediaries. According to the Crowdfunding Industry
Report’s estimates, by December 2013, there will be over 530 crowdfunding platforms and intermediaries.276 This Article proceeds to provide a typology of different types of crowdfunding intermediaries and their portals.
There are three primary types of crowdfunding intermediaries: (1) Patronage
Crowdfunding Intermediaries,277 (2) Equity Crowdfunding Intermediaries,278
and (3) Lending Crowdfunding Intermediaries.279 The last category includes
the online P2P websites described in the previous Sections. The crowdfunding
intermediaries and portals described below were chosen because they are either, founded in the United States or they primarily serve a U.S. market. These
portals are also among the most famous, longstanding, and well-established
crowdfunding platforms. These intermediaries and portals are also members of,
or are accredited by, the Crowdfunding Industry’s prime accreditation organization, the Crowdfunding Accreditation for Platform Standards (CAPS).280
CAPS is “an initiative by Crowdsourcing.org to promote the adoption of best
practices for the operation of crowdfunding platforms globally.”281
273
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1. Patronage Crowdfunding Intermediaries
Patronage crowdfunding portals connect businesses, organizations, or
individuals with financial contributors. These intermediaries, and their
portals, are different in their emphasis, organizational structures, and practices, but generally contributors on these sites do not expect a financial
return on their monetary contribution.282 The prototypical, and most famous, patronage crowdfunding portal is Kickstarter.com (Kickstarter).
Launched in 2009, Kickstarter primarily connects artists, musicians,
filmmakers, writers, and designers, residing in any location, with financial
contributors for their creative projects.283 Individual or organizational
“project creators” sign up with Kickstarter for free.284 Project creators develop a creative project and then market it to potential contributors on
Kickstarter’s project portal.285 A project campaign can be generated by an
individual artist, a group or community of artists, a fledgling label, or an
organization. Kickstarter’s choice of the word “project” to describe the
undertaking seeking funding connotes that the endeavor is finite and is
achievable within a relatively short timeframe. Project creators retain
complete control over the framing, marketing, and design of their creative
projects.286 Kickstarter, however, retains control over which creative projects
will be released on the portal for potential funding.287 Kickstarter develops
guidelines for possible projects and prohibits charity and cause funding, as
well as projects to raise funds for personal expenses such as to pay bills,
tuition, purchase items, or go on vacation.288 A recent New York Times
article reported that in a given week, Kickstarter received 1890 proposals
that were “each evaluated by a ‘community team’ of about a half-dozen
people. About forty percent are rejected (although most of those flagrantly
ignore the site’s guidelines—which bar charitable fund-raising, offering
financial incentives and of course anything involving Jenny’s prom
dress—or are incomprehensible).”289
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When a creative project is approved by Kickstarter, project creators
then make an open online call or request for funds on the crowdfunding
portal to help bring the project to fruition. The amount of money sought
for a project is determined by the project creator. Kickstarter’s model is
“all-or-nothing funding,” meaning that the project must be fully funded
and reach its fundraising goals within a specified timeframe in order for
any money to change hands.290 The typical timeframe for full funding is
thirty to sixty days.291 Potential contributors, referred to by Kickstarter as
“backers,” also do not pay to join Kickstarter.292 Backers can peruse the
different approved project campaigns available on Kickstarter and choose to
donate to a particular campaign or campaigns.293 The “most common” contribution on Kickstarter is $25.294 A few to thousands of contributors can fund
a given campaign. Kickstarter uses the third-party collection service Amazon
Payments to transmit funds.295 The contribution is “validated upon making
the pledge, so Kickstarter’s collection rate is close to 100 percent.”296
Project creators entice contributors with the creative strength of their
idea, but also with tangible nonmonetary rewards related to the project, such
as a copy of the creative project being funded, a limited edition, a free tshirt, a visit to see the band perform, a free screening, and other rewards.297
These rewards are analogous to membership benefits that a member of a
non-profit, membership organization might receive, yet they are related to
the commercial projects being funded. Contributors only receive rewards if
the entire project is funded within the specified timeframe. These rewards,
however, do not provide contributors a financial return on their investment.
Kickstarter takes a five percent commission on any successfully funded
campaigns.298 As a for-profit company, this is how Kickstarter makes its
money. Kickstarter’s initial success is uncontroverted.299 It raised $15 million in its first year of existence.300 In 2011, Kickstarter raised $99 million
290
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for 27,000 projects.301 Kickstarter raises the most for film and music projects, with $32 million pledged for film projects in 2011, and $19.8 million in 2011 for music projects.302 Projects generally surpass their goals,
“typically hitting 130% of the target amount.”303 The average amount
raised per project campaign is $4500.304 Ambitious and successful projects
“routinely muster $100,000 or more,”305 and the most successful projects
raise $1 million or more.306 Kickstarter represents an opportunity for geographically and economically marginalized individuals, groups, and communities to access new sources of capital for artistic endeavors.307 However, there is not a substantial community benefit to participating in
Kickstarter, as cause funding is not permitted according to Kickstarter’s
guidelines. Further, the average amount of money raised by each project
on Kickstarter is not sufficient to sustain a start-up business endeavor that
could alleviate poverty. Yet, the Kickstarter model does expand the financing possibilities for traditionally marginalized economic actors seeking funding for creative projects.
Kickstarter’s success has led to a proliferation of other crowdfunding
intermediary portals based upon the patronage model such as IndieGoGo.com
(Indiegogo) and Rockethub.com (Rockethub). Indiegogo, founded in 2008,
initially served as a source of funding for independent filmmakers,308 but it
expanded in 2009 to include many other creative and noncreative industries, including those that Kickstarter does not fund, such as cause funding—environment, education, health, politics, religion community, and
entrepreneurial funding—food, small business, sports, and technology.309
Rockethub.com is a crowdfunding intermediary that serves groups similar
to those served by Indiegogo, but also targets scientists.310 Indiegogo is
also a worldwide crowdfunding platform; however, Indiegogo is incorporated in the United States and it only accepts and disburses funds in U.S.
301

2011: The Stats, KICKSTARTER BLOG (Jan. 9, 2012), http://www.kickstarter.com
/blog/2011-the-stats.
302
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G.F., Crowdfunding: Micro no more, BABBAGE (Jan. 22, 2012), http://www.economist
.com/blogs/babbage/2012/01/crowdfunding.
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Id.
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See, e.g., Jacques-Jean Tiziou, How Philly Moves, KICKSTARTER, http://www.kickstarter
.com/projects/jjtiziou/how-philly-moves?ref=most-funded (last visited Mar. 23, 2013).
308
See About Us, INDIEGOGO, http://www.indiegogo.com/about/our-story (last visited
Mar. 23, 2013).
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Compare id., with Project Guidelines, KICKSTARTER, supra note 288.
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See Learn More, ROCKETHUB, http://www.rockethub.com/learnmore/intro#what-is
-rockethub-answer (last visited Mar. 23, 2013).
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dollars.311 Receiving $15 million from a recent Series A venture capitalist
financing round, Indiegogo has raised a larger amount of equity financing
than Kickstarter to support its operations.312 Indiegogo allows users to create and contribute to campaigns for free, but it has a slightly different
funding scheme than Kickstarter that enables campaign creators to retain
the funds they raise, even if they do not meet their goal within a scheduled
time frame.313
Under its flexible funding model, if a campaign does not reach its funding goals, then campaign creators keep all money raised minus a nine percent fee, and creators must fulfill all pledge promises.314 Indiegogo’s funding model enables campaign creators to benefit from any amount of money
raised, yet reduces the incentives to meet and set realistic goals. Additionally, some intermediaries more narrowly connect funding seekers and contributors in particular sectors,315 interest groups,316 or ethnic communities.317
As such, they limit the bridging potential of cyberfinancing because individuals seeking funding on these sites can only access more limited social
networks than what is possible on portals that support all types of crowdfunding in any location. Thus, the more targeted crowdfunding portals do not
have the redistributive potential of their more inclusive counterparts.
Many newer crowdfunding intermediaries include advancing economic
and social justice as a primary goal.318 StartSomeGood.com (StartSomeGood),
for example, connects non-profits and social entrepreneurs319 with seed capital.
311

Indiegogo FAQ, INDIEGOGO, http://www.indiegogo.com/indiegogo-faq (last visited
Mar. 23, 2013); see also Jay A. Ferdandez, With a $15 Million Infusion, Crowdfunder
Indiegogo Angles for World Domination, INDIEWIRE (2012), http://www.indiewire.com/arti
cle/crowdfunding-powerhouse-indiegogo-angles-for-world-domination-with-infusion-of-15
-million (last visited Mar. 23, 2013) (explaining that Indiegogo has a presence in more than
190 countries).
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Series A to Make Crowdfunding Go Mainstream, TECHCRUNCH (June 6, 2012), http://tech
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Local Nonprofits, FLYING KITE (Mar. 20, 2012), http://www.flyingkitemedia.com/innova
tionnews/fundingworks0320.aspx.
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See, e.g., FAITHFUNDER, https://www.faithfunder.com (last visited Mar. 23, 2013);
INLU, https://www.inlu.com (last visited Mar. 23, 2013).
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See, e.g., JEWCER, http://jewcer.com (last visited Mar. 23, 2013) (a crowdfunding platform for projects, ideas, and causes benefitting the global Jewish community and Israel).
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Frank Barry, 9 Social Media for Social Good Sites You Should Know About,
NETWITSTHINKTANK (Jan. 11, 2011), http://www.netwitsthinktank.com/online-fundrais
ing/9-social-media-for-social-good-sites-you-should-know-about.htm.
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About StartSomeGood, STARTSOMEGOOD, http://startsomegood.com/Help/About
(last visited Mar. 23, 2013); see also Thomas Kelley, Law and Choice of Entity on the
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“StartSomeGood allows all forms of social good initiatives, nonprofit and forprofit, one-off and ongoing, local and international ....”320 As with other intermediaries, StartSomeGood determines which campaigns qualify as social
ventures and which will be released to the public on the portal.321 Campaigns
on StartSomeGood establish a total fundraising goal and a “tipping point”
goal, which is the minimum amount of money the campaign creator determines is needed to “start doing good.”322 Without this amount, the social venture cannot happen at all. Fundraising for the “tipping point” is conducted
under the “all or nothing model,” such that if the tipping point is not reached,
no money changes hands.323 Once the tipping point is reached, campaign creators can keep whatever amount is raised above the tipping point.324 StartSomeGood charges a five percent fee of total funds received by a campaign
after the tipping point is reached, and after a third-party payment processing
fee of three percent is levied.325 Notably, StartSomeGood is a for-profit organization.326 Most donations from campaign supporters are not taxdeductible, barring some exceptions (for example, donations to nonprofits).327 Although StartSomeGood has advancing social and economic justice as its mission because it targets socially motivated audiences, it may limit
economically and geographically isolated social entrepreneurs’ financial networking options. Contributors who are not interested in social good may not
learn about these projects if they use only for-profit-oriented portals. Thus,
StartSomeGood’s targeting can limit the potential audiences that social venture promoters can access to support their causes and endeavors.
2. Equity Crowdfunding Intermediaries
Patronage crowdfunding was the predominant model of crowdfunding328
prior to President Barack Obama’s signing of Congress’s bipartisan Jumpstart
Social Enterprise Frontier, 84 TUL. L. REV. 337, 339 (2009). (quoting David Gergen, The
New Engines of Reform, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 20, 2006, at 48, who defines
social entrepreneurs as “people who envision widespread, systemic change ... with an
entrepreneurial and innovative spirit”).
320
How It Works: Crowdfunding, STARTSOMEGOOD, http://startsomegood.com/Help
/HowItWorks (last visited Mar. 23, 2013).
321
FAQ, STARTSOMEGOOD, http://startsomegood.com/Help/FAQ (last visited Mar.
23, 2013).
322
How It Works, STARTSOMEGOOD, supra note 320.
323
FAQ, STARTSOMEGOOD, supra note 321.
324
How It Works, STARTSOMEGOOD, supra note 320.
325
FAQ, STARTSOMEGOOD, supra note 321.
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Id.
328
Adrienne Burke, Crowdfunding a Promising Option for Businesses Seeking Loans
and Investors, Report Indicates, SMALL BUSVOTE BLOG (May 9, 2012), http://smallbus

358

WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 4:309

Our Business Startups Act on April 5, 2012.329 As described below, this new
legislation makes it legal for crowdfunding portals to allow entrepreneurs
to provide their online contributors with an equity, profit or revenue sharing interest in their endeavors. Since the JOBS Act’s recent enactment,
equity crowdfunding portals are developing rapidly. It is unclear how these newcomers will affect the popularity of the patronage model, and
whether their presence will be a positive or negative development for marginalized economic actors. Prior to the enactment of the JOBS Act, most
venture or campaign promoters seeking crowdfunding were unwilling to
grant equity interests to contributors because granting such interests required promoters to comply with complex, and costly, federal and state
securities laws.330 As explained earlier, U.S. securities laws do not define
the term “security.”331 According to the tests established by the Supreme
Court in Howey, transactions facilitated through an equity crowdfunding
portal would likely qualify as “investment contracts” because investors
contribute through the portal with the expectation that they will make a
profit solely from the efforts of the campaign promoters or the crowdfunding intermediaries themselves.332
Before the JOBS Act, crowdfunding intermediaries that allowed venture promoters to offer investors a financial return would have had to
comply with the SEC’s registration requirements.333 These transactions
could also qualify as private placement offerings, which are exempt from
the full registration requirements of the Securities Act of 1933; however,
private placement offerings are primarily available to wealthy and sophisticated “accredited investors,” who have some prior relationship to the
venture or campaign promoter, or to the promoter’s affiliate.334 The private placement laws also allow a company to have only up to 500 nonaccredited investors before it must register its offerings with the SEC and
qualify as a public company.335 Companies seeking funding through equity
crowdfunding portals could easily violate this restriction, forcing a company
iness.yahoo.com/advisor/blogs/smallbiz-vote/crowdfunding-promising-option-businessesseeking-loans-investors-report-165903781.html (explaining that “452 crowdfunding platforms
worldwide raised a total of $1.5 billion for more than 1 million campaigns in 2011.... [T]he
majority of those campaigns were in the donation-based crowdfunding category ...”).
329
See JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012).
330
Burkett, supra note 7, at 64.
331
See S.E.C. v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 297 (1946).
332
Burkett, supra note 7, at 80–84.
333
Prior to the JOBS Act, only a few crowdfunding intermediary portals either violated,
or attempted to navigate, the complicated U.S securities law regime. See Pope, supra note
7, at 979–81.
334
See Burkett, supra note 7, at 84–85.
335
JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012).
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to go public upon receiving a certain number of non-accredited investors via
the portal. Lastly, crowdfunding’s redistributive promise lies in its ability
to connect fledgling enterprises to new economic and social networks.
Forcing companies to comply with the private placement requirements
would have undermined the industry’s redistributive potential.
The JOBS Act, however, creates a new crowdfunding exemption that
permits newly defined “emerging growth companies” (EGCs) to raise up to
$1 million of capital from a large pool of investors through crowdfunding
portals.336 The Act defines an EGC as an issuer that had total annual gross
revenues of less than $1 billion during its most recently completed fiscal
year.337 The Act enables EGCs to provide contributors with equity interests
in their ventures by selling securities that are exempt from traditional registration and exemption requirements.338 The Act also legalizes “general solicitation,”339 enabling EGCs to use crowdfunding portals and other social
networking sites, such as Facebook and LinkedIn, to raise investment capital for their enterprises. Crowdfunding transactions can only be conducted
through a broker or crowdfunding portal that is registered with the SEC.340
The Act provides that crowdfunding intermediary portals cannot provide investment advice or recommendations to investors, as can brokers.341 Further,
the crowdfunding portals must ensure that investors review certain educational
material and acknowledge that investors both understand the risks of the investment and can internalize or handle those risks.342 The crowdfunding portals
must also take steps to reduce fraud in these transactions.343
The JOBS Act also permits EGCs to stay private for a longer period of
time and makes it easier for them to go public on the securities markets
when ready. Prior regulations made it difficult for small companies to obtain equity investments from a large numbers of small non-accredited investors without registering with the SEC.344 The existing securities registration
336

Securities Act of 1933 § 4(a)(6)(A), amended by JOBS Act § 302(a).
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Bradford, The New Federal Crowdfunding Exemption: Promise Unfilled, 40 SEC. REG. L. J.
195, 222–23 (2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2066088 (explaining how the JOBS
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340
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exemptions do not directly fit the crowdfunding model.345 Regulatory hurdles also increased the costs associated with becoming a public company.346
The JOBS Act resolves these problems by raising the number of nonaccredited investors an EGC can have to 2000, and excluding employee
shareholders in that number.347 This permits EGCs to obtain more investors
through crowdfunding portals without having to comply with the costly traditional securities regime. The Act also extends the number of years EGCs
have to comply with Sarbanes-Oxley348 to five years and reduces the number of required audited financial statements.349 To reduce fraud and protect
unsophisticated investors, the Act also limits the amount each individual
investor can invest as well as the aggregate value of securities that a particular EGC issuer can offer through a crowdfunding intermediary.
During any twelve-month period, an EGC issuer may sell up to $1 million of its securities.350 Investors with income or net worth of less than
$100,000 are only permitted to invest the greater of $2000 or of five percent
of their annual or net worth or income in any twelve-month period.351 Investors with an income or net worth greater than $100,000 can invest the
greater of $100,000 or ten percent of their annual income or net worth in
any twelve-month period.352 Investors are also limited to investing up to
$100,000 in crowdfunding issues in a given twelve-month period.353 Further, investors who purchase securities in a crowdfunding transaction are
restricted from transferring or selling those securities for a period of one
year.354 Finally, consistent with the SEC’s focus on disclosure as a method
of investor protection, EGC issuers of securities must also comply with a
number of disclosure requirements. The Act requires EGC issuers to provide investors through the crowdfunding portal with the following: (1) a
description of the issuer, its members, including the name, legal status,
physical address, and names of directors and officers holding more than
twenty percent of the shares of the issuer; (2) the anticipated business plan
of the issuer, the target offering amount and the deadline to reach the target
345
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347
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offering amount, and the price of the securities to the public; (3) the ownership and capital structure of the issuer, including the terms of the securities being offered.355
Many equity crowdfunding intermediaries now have increased confidence to enter the market as a result of the JOBS Act reforms and the impending SEC implementing regulations.356 Several new crowdfunding intermediaries are entering the market and will begin operating after the SEC
introduces its regulations.357 While crowdfunding options are expanding in
the wake of the JOBS Act, there is still a great deal of uncertainty surrounding the forthcoming SEC regulations. There is some concern that the
SEC could overregulate and essentially undo any benefit of the crowdfunding provisions.358 In response, the Crowdfunding Intermediary Regulatory
Advocates (CFIRA) are advocating for rules and regulations that are consistent with the purpose of the JOBS Act—“improving access to the public
capital markets for emerging growth companies” that will be job creators.359
The group includes several crowdfunding intermediary executives and innovators, including the co-founder of Crowdfunder.com.360 Until the SEC issues
its regulations, many crowdfunding intermediaries are delaying their plans to
develop portals that permit equity interests. RockthePost.com, for example, is a
crowdfunding portal that is currently only using the patronage model.361 Rock
the Post is still interested in allowing investors to contribute funds in exchange
for equity, but it will wait until the SEC regulations are published.362 Kickstarter also does not plan to ever allow contributors to receive equity, profit, or
revenue sharing interests in exchange for their contributions.363 Kickstarter’s
355
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founder stated, “[w]e’re not gearing up for the equity wave if it comes
....”364
3. Lending and Debt-Based Crowdfunding Intermediaries
Lastly, lending or debt-based crowdfunding intermediaries are portals
that allow lenders to receive a return on their investment in the form of
“fixed periodic income [payments] and ... repayment of the original principal investment.”365 Lending or debt-based crowdfunding includes P2P lending, peer-to-business lending, and social lending.366 This form of crowdfunding enables borrowers—both individuals and businesses—to appeal to
the crowd rather than a traditional financial institution for loans or debtbased securities. SoMoLend.com (SoMoLend), for example, is an accredited crowdfunding platform that “connect[s small businesses] with banks,
corporations, Chambers of Commerce, and cities to get small business loans
... at lower than average rates.”367 It endeavors “to serve small businesses
that are not being served by traditional funding,”368 and to provide investors
“higher-than-market return[s].”369 Like other P2P lending platforms,370
SoMoLend gives its lenders payment-dependent notes and works with a
partner bank to execute transactions.371 Entrepreneurs sign up for SoMoLend by completing a loan application and creating a web-based SoMoLend profile.372 Borrowers provide credit information to SoMoLend, plus
other information about their personal and business finances, and SoMoLend generates a star-based risk level rating based upon that information.373 Star ratings range from one to five stars.374 A one-star borrower
must at least have a personal credit score above 550 and a five-star borrower must have a personal credit score above 800.375 The commercial
364
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366
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367
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(last visited Mar. 23, 2013).
369
Lending Money Is Easy with SoMoLend!, SOMOLEND, https://www.somolend.com
/Lend/Lenderinfo.aspx (last visited Mar. 23, 2013).
370
See supra Part II.A.
371
Lending Money Is Easy with SoMoLend!, SOMOLEND, supra note 369.
372
How to Apply for a Loan, SOMOLEND, https://www.somolend.com/How-It-Works
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loans available to business borrowers range from $100 to $1 million.376
According to SoMoLend, the site still facilitates loans to individuals with
little to no credit history377 and providing individual and commercial loans
to underserved entrepreneurs is one of the company’s stated goals.378 Yet,
it is unclear how the company will square this goal with its for-profit mission. SoMoLend’s approach to lending also has a geographic dimension.
SoMoLend’s “technology platform uses a GPS location tracking system
(think foursquare) so investors can view a map of approved business borrowers in their [geographic] community.”379 Interestingly, this feature encourages lenders to lend to entrepreneurs in their immediate geographic community.380 This feature may limit the networking potential of crowdfunding by
facilitating connections only between lenders and entrepreneurs in the same
geographic area.
C. New Identities, Reputations, and Communities 2.0
Cyberfinancing sites create new cyberspaces for repeated economic activity. Borrowers and lenders, or investors and entrepreneurs, can now engage in repeat transactions on the same site and craft new identities in this
cyberspace. Borrowers and entrepreneurs previously marginalized from
mainstream American markets can now develop new identities and reputations online based upon the strength of their ideas, the popularity of their
campaigns, and their repayment and credit histories. Lenders and investors,
as well as borrowers and entrepreneurs, can form groups online and evaluate one another’s economic performance. As such, cyberfinancing markets
enable individuals and groups to create new communities online. Scholars
and practitioners who view these economic exchanges merely as discrete
one-time transactions may ignore the complexity and community building
potential of these spaces and their redistributive consequences.
Prosper, for example, facilitates the creation of groups of prospective
borrowers and lenders on its platform. Individuals or organizations can
register on the site as “group leaders” and, upon signing a registration
statement, can head a group of prospective borrowers or lenders.381 Individuals form groups and communities of interest, as well as communities
376
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based upon identities or geographic location. Group leaders or borrower
groups do not guarantee other members’ payments.382 However, group
leaders are responsible for establishing the group, recruiting members, acting as a liaison between Prosper and group members, and monitoring, protecting, and promoting the integrity of their group.383 One of the purposes
of borrower groups is to use group social norms to encourage borrowers to
repay on time.384 Prior to September 2007, group leaders received a finder’s fee for each loan resulting from its group listing, but Prosper canceled
that feature.385 These groups develop an identity and reputation within
Prosper’s cyberspace. Prosper enables users to search groups386 and rates
the various groups based upon their performance.387
LendingClub does not use group leaders, but individual borrowers and
lenders do develop a reputation on the site based upon their repayment histories or funding activity.388 Kickstarter promotes campaigns and creates
communities of interest by categorizing campaigns and highlighting featured campaigns.389 Among the featured campaigns are staff picks, recently launched, most funded, curated pages, popular pages, and ending soon
campaigns.390 It also segments campaigns by cities.391 Indiegogo, similarly, segments campaigns by cities392 and facilitates the creation of new
identities, reputations, and communities online through its Gogofactor Exposure.393 Gogofactor is a “merit-based algorithm that tracks the level of
activity of each campaign based on how much you share, update, and attract funding.”394 Based upon a campaign creator’s “gogofactor activity,”
Indiegogo offers to expose the campaign through social media outreach in
382
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of Prosper.com 7 (Univ. of Md. Dep’t of Econ., Working Paper, June 20, 2008), available at
http://www.prosper.com/downloads/research/dynamic-learning-selection-06 2008.pdf.
385
Id. at 8.
386
Quick Invest, PROSPER, http://www.prosper.com/invest/quick-invest.aspx (last visited
Mar. 23, 2013).
387
Id.
388
GAO REPORT, supra note 10.
389
Discover Projects, KICKSTARTER, http://www.kickstarter.com/discover (last visited
Mar. 23, 2013).
390
Id.
391
Id.
392
INDIEGOGO, http://www.indiegogo.com/ (click on “browse” at top of screen) (last
visited Mar. 23, 2013).
393
Features of Indiegogo, INDIEGOGO, http://www.indiegogo.com/features-of-indiego
go (last visited Mar. 23, 2013).
394
Id.
383

2013]

CYBERFINANCING FOR ECONOMIC JUSTICE

365

their community, through the content creation process, and by giving the campaign press access.395 Both crowdfunding platforms also highlight campaigns
through blogs and through partner crowdfunding sites or organizations.396
Like Kickstarter and Indiegogo, StartSomeGood also promotes campaigns through a blog and links to other social networking communities.397
StartSomeGood has similar features to help funders segment their contributions to different types of social entrepreneurs.398 It also allows users to
filter campaigns by country, cause, or partner.399 Kiva also facilitates the
creation of “lending teams.”400 Lending teams are groups of lenders with
common interests, demography, or geography.401 Members of Kiva’s lending teams continue lending as individuals, but they have the option to
count their individual loans towards the loan totals for their lending
team.402 Any lender can create a lending team.403 Currently, there are 626
domestic lending teams out of the 23,467 lending teams on Kiva.404 However, Kiva does not facilitate the creation of borrower groups. Because
Kiva works with microfinance field partners, they likely do not feel the
need to facilitate borrower groups, but it is interesting that the microfinance field partners and their respective borrowers are denied a networking opportunity provided to lenders. These groups facilitate limited social
networking among members, but more importantly, they enable users to
segment their cyberfinancing experience. Just as public officials create
jurisdictional boundaries, zoning, and land use laws to segment and create
markets in geographic space, cyberfinancing intermediaries’ access and
interactional rules order cyberfinancing markets and enable users to segment cyberspace. Yet, the public has little control over these practices, except to give the intermediaries feedback about their sites.
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III. REGULATING CYBERFINANCING FOR ECONOMIC JUSTICE
A. Social Networking, Internet Intermediaries and Trust
1. Expanding Social and Financial Networks—The Strength of Weak Ties
If properly operated and regulated, cyberfinancing networks can enhance an individual’s or a community’s weak social ties.405 Weak social
ties describe connections between individuals or communities who do not
interact frequently and who know each other only vaguely.406 Strong social
ties describe bonds between members of closely knit, friendship, or familial
networks.407 As sociologist Mark Granovetter explained in his seminal article, The Strength of Weak Ties, “weak [social] ties are an important resource
in making possible mobility opportunity.”408 Individuals and groups are better able to connect to new financing, job, or economic networks though
weak ties than through strong ones.
However, the policies, practices, and contracts of the cyberfinancing
intermediaries will determine, in part, how much an individual or group
can develop weak ties that bridge to new opportunities. Cyberfinancing
intermediaries that develop minimum credit scores or minimum capitalization requirements will inevitably limit access. Cyberfinancing intermediaries that encourage users to seek crowdfunding or loans through their existing familial or friendship networks will also limit the bridging capacity of
these networks. If Kiva does not adequately develop its American capacity, then American microentrepreneurs may not be able to connect to new
microfinancing networks. Thus, while these cyberfinancing networks undoubtedly provide marginalized groups in the United States opportunities
to develop more weak social ties, the market practices of these intermediaries may limit the bridging opportunities that cyberfinancing can provide.
Marginalized borrowers and entrepreneurs must now trust the cyberfinancing intermediaries to structure their operations to maximize access.409 Yet, lenders and investors will also trust that the intermediaries
405
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will limit their financial and operational risks. These interests will often
conflict, and in the absence of regulation, it is likely that lenders’ and investors’ interests will prevail, since the majority of cyberfinancing intermediaries are for-profit organizations designed to maximize profits. While
users will rely on their own positive experiences with these cyberfinancing
intermediaries to evaluate the intermediaries’ trustworthiness, they will
also rely on the reputations of the Internet intermediaries, and the intermediaries’ corporate or organizational forms.
2. Trusting the Intermediaries and Hybrid Organizational Forms
Investors seeking a monetary return from their participation in cyberfinancing markets must trust that the for-profit cyberfinancing intermediaries will identify good investment opportunities and minimize fraud and
abuse on these sites, because the cyberfinancing intermediaries are profitmaximizing entities. In unregulated complex markets, the neoclassical and
new institutional economic presumption is that with full disclosure and
perfect information, market competition between profit-oriented cyberfinancing intermediaries will provide sufficient discipline against poor quality, opportunism, or malfeasance.410 Yet, the recent subprime mortgage
crisis illustrates that in complex and unregulated markets, pursuit of profit
alone does not provide sufficient deterrents to opportunism, fraud, and
abuse. Further, first-time investors, borrowers, and entrepreneurs often
will not have perfect information in these markets, and thus cannot be assured that the institutional or organizational forms of the for-profit cyberfinancing intermediaries will deter opportunism and fraud.
Moreover, contributors on these sites, who are not seeking a financial
return on their investment, have even less assurance that the organizational
forms of the cyberfinancing intermediaries will provide adequate protection against opportunism or will adequately advance social returns. Henry
Hansmann, in his definitive article on the non-profit organizational form,
The Role of Non-Profit Enterprise, explained that a traditional justification
for the existence of non-profit organizations is contract failure.411 In the
410
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past, individuals seeking to advance social goals by providing financing
and/or goods and services to low-income individuals could often not contract directly with the individuals they were seeking to serve.412 Contributors had no direct connection with the beneficiaries, so non-profit—rather
than for-profit—producers or intermediaries were a more sensible choice
because non-profit organizations must advance social goals and are prevented from using any excess profit to provide financial returns to insiders
or investors.413 Because non-profit intermediaries’ non-distribution constraints eliminate competing financial objectives, they are more likely to
fulfill social objectives.414 Contributors can also reduce their monitoring
costs because the state monitors the behavior of the intermediaries.415
While these justifications for the non-profit form still hold true in many
instances, the operation of cyberfinancing markets complicates these assumptions. Cyberfinancing intermediaries allow contributors and beneficiaries to
interact and to contract more directly than before the development of Web
2.0. Further, many cyberfinancing intermediaries purporting to provide social
returns are for-profit organizations. StartSomeGood is a for-profit organization designed to help social entrepreneurs.416 It seeks certification as a B
corporation to indicate to investors that advancing social objectives is a central part of its mission, but it still must cater to the needs of its investors.417
SoMoLend is a for-profit lender who provides investors a return on their
investment, but also seeks to expand access to credit for traditionally marginalized entrepreneurs.418
Kiva is a non-profit organization whose intermediation in microfinance
transactions reflects the existing structure of microfinance; however, it also
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fulfills a financial function.419 Kiva also provides contributors a return of
principal, while endeavoring to advance the social cause of economic empowerment.420 Notably, Kiva’s founders originally intended Kiva to be a
for-profit LLC.421 Yet, “given the legal issues around securitization and
charging interest, they ‘decided that the 501(c)(3) status would help
[them] form a bond with [their] users and raise a small amount of donation
capital to get the idea off the ground.’”422 Presumably, Kiva’s choice of
the non-profit form provides a “signaling” function to Kiva’s lenders, field
partners, and microborrowers that Kiva is a “trustworthy” intermediary
who will fulfill its social mission.423 Yet, it may be equally beneficial for
Kiva to eventually adopt an LC3 organizational form, or to adopt a corporate form that would enable it to qualify as an equity crowdfunding intermediary under the new crowdfunding exemption.
As cyberfinancing markets increasingly blur the lines between forprofit and non-profit organizations, cyberfinancing intermediaries’ organizational forms alone do not provide sufficient market discipline to enhance
trust and to minimize opportunism in these markets. Disclosures provided
to state and federal regulators also may be insufficient to capture how benign rules and organizational structures operate to prevent poorer, or traditionally marginalized economic actors, from participation in these markets. As Mark Granovetter eloquently explained, “both order and disorder,
honesty and malfeasance [in economic markets] have more to do with
structures of such relations than they do with organizational form.”424
In complex economic transactions, the economic interactions and social
relations that occur between and within hierarchically integrated organizations can produce or inhibit trust or malfeasance. Thus, as cyberfinancing
markets involve an increasingly complex proliferation of organizational and
institutional forms that provide similar and/or related functions and that
work collaboratively,425 the interactions and relations between cyberfinancing
419
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intermediaries may become as relevant as the interactions within a cyberfinancing intermediary or between a cyberfinancing intermediary and its customers. In that event, organizational structures are inadequate to ensure accountability to traditionally marginalized economic actors. While the recent
SEC-focused regulation of cyberfinancing industries should provide investors some protection from fraud and abuse in these markets, inexperienced
borrowers and entrepreneurs cannot rely on the current regulatory structure
of cyberfinancing markets to protect their interests.
3. Laws, Practices, and Norms in Cyberspace
It is evident that cyberspace enables “ways of interacting that were not
possible before” its development.426 Yet, there are similarities between the
social construction of geographic space and the social construction of cyberspace. Laws, norms, and community practices in cyberspace give human interaction in that space meaning. Laws both influence and reflect the social
allocations of power within geographic and cyberspace. Just as jurisdictional
boundaries and zoning and land use laws define space, constitute markets
within space, and include and exclude certain individuals from markets, the
visible and invisible codes of cyberfinancing websites order social relations
within those spaces and reflect certain political and value choices.427 The visible codes of cyberfinancing markets that determine who can and who cannot
participate in cybermarkets are the end user license agreements, privacy policies, group leader agreements, organizational structures, selection and participation requirements, segmenting practices, and interactional rules. The invisible codes of cyberspace are those program decisions that order cyberspace
that cannot be seen by consumers.428 These codes also determine the quality
of users’ experiences in that space.
The cyberfinancing markets discussed in this Article tend to promote
transparency, regarding their visible codes, by publishing financial and
non-financial information about users, by providing their contracts and
policies on the web, and by seeking customer feedback. Yet, the institutional concerns of these cyberfinancing intermediaries will inevitably influence how they order their cybermarkets. Cyberfinancing intermediaries
426
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are private organizations that are making value choices about how cyberfinancing markets should be structured. The consumer public has limited
control over cyberfinancing intermediaries’ choices. Initially, the technological advances and practices of these cyberfinancing intermediaries provided benefits to, and advanced efficiency for, all users by reducing the
transaction costs associated with connection, selection, lending, and financing. In fact, because these intermediaries did not have physical bank
branches, were unregulated, and could facilitate transactions across time
and space in an efficient way, they had a competitive advantage over other
financial institutions.429
However, motivated by profits, and in response to increased SEC
scrutiny and regulation, the for-profit P2P lending intermediaries tended
to direct more benefits to lenders and to restrict marginal borrowers’ access to these markets.430 Prosper and LendingClub further intermediated
in transactions and increased their minimum credit score requirements.
Prosper stopped giving bonuses to group leaders to discourage fraud.431
The non-profit platform Kiva chose to work within the existing framework of
microfinance institutions—rather than to connect microborrowers and lenders
directly—to minimize lenders’ and Kiva’s financial risks. Additionally, the
United States’ current and proposed regulation of crowdfunding markets appears to privilege investors’ interests and impose costs on entrepreneurs. Although the JOBS Act does partially increase inexperienced actors’ access to
capital markets by removing some regulatory and transaction cost barriers, it
still creates significant disclosure and regulatory burdens for issuers of equity
interests on crowdfunding portals.432
In order to protect investors, the JOBS Act provides that “[i]ssuers must
furnish full financial statements for even the smallest offerings. Those financial statements must be reviewed by independent public accountants if
the offering is for $100,000 or more, and audited if the offering is for more
than $500,000.”433 It will be difficult for many start-up companies and
429
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first-time issuers, who have no prior experience with capital markets, to understand and comply with these disclosure requirements.434 The Act does
not include a “substantial compliance” provision as do other securities exemptions, leaving inexperienced entrepreneurs potentially liable for “innocent and immaterial” violations.435 The Act also does not contain protections for issuers who “reasonably believed” that they complied with the
requirements of the disclosure rules.436 Lastly, the Act’s limits on how
much each investor can invest are high and do not distinguish between the
disclosure requirements for small investments of, say, less than $500 and
investments ranging from $500 to $2000.437 Consequently, the Sustainable
Economies Law Center—through the umbrella organization, the American
Sustainable Business Council (ASBC)—proposed that the SEC create a
“two-tier regulatory system ... with a reduced regulatory burden for small,
local offerings.”438 They propose that smaller investments of up to $250 per
investor from investors who live in the same state or within a 200-mile radius should be subject to reduced disclosures since the risk of loss and fraud is
less for smaller investments from issuers in close proximity to investors.439
This regulatory suggestion provides a solution to the increased disclosure
burdens that the JOBS Act imposes on small, inexperienced issuers.
Further, the increased presence of equity crowdfunding intermediaries
may affect the popularity of the patronage model, which currently provides opportunities for economically marginalized individuals and groups
to obtain funding. As venture capital funds and wealthier accredited investors have more confidence to enter the crowdfunding market, they may
dominate the direction of the market and encourage intermediaries to develop rules, practices, and norms that disadvantage smaller, first-time issuers, investors, and entrepreneurs. Historically disadvantaged groups also
often have difficulty obtaining capital from mainstream American capital
markets.440 This is not typically the result of intentional racial animus, but
rather because start-up minority and urban entrepreneurs frequently do not
have access to the social and financial networks that lead to angel investment
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or venture capital.441 Thus, these new players on the crowdfunding scene
may divert attention and interest away from inexperienced EGCs towards
the kinds of start-up and Internet companies that angel investors and venture capital funds traditionally invest in—those with the quickest potential
for the highest returns. Additionally, venture capital investors, and increasingly angel investors, often require significant control over the entities in
which they invest. EGCs owned by individuals traditionally marginalized
from mainstream American markets should be wary that their participation
in these markets may leave them susceptible to investors who will require
substantial control of their companies in exchange for relatively small investments. Thus, these cyberfinancing intermediaries’ policies and practices, and the United States’ efforts to regulate these markets, reflect
tradeoffs between the interests of mainstream and wealthy market actors
and the interests of poorer and more marginalized economic actors. Without a regulatory adjustment, these trends will persist, thereby undermining
economic justice.
4. Weblining in Cyberfinancing Markets442
The invisible codes of cyberspace are “how the software and hardware
(i.e., the ‘code’ of cyberspace) that make cyberspace what it is also regulate
cyberspace as it is.”443 Thus, software programs that determine who can enter cyberspace, what they can extract from it, who owns what is produced
there, and whether that product can be shared, operate to regulate cyberspace and shape cybermarkets.444 Like land use laws and jurisdictional
boundaries in geographic space, the invisible codes of cyberspace also reflect certain value choices that are the result of existing social allocations of
power. Yet, unlike land use laws and jurisdictional boundaries in geographic
441
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space, the invisible codes of cyberspace are not made public and are not
subject to public comment or review. Invisible codes are now shaping
cybermarkets. Banks, retailers, social networking sites, and Internet browsers now use invisible programming and tracking codes to influence who can
participate in and benefit from certain cybermarkets. Some companies use
this information to segment and customize markets to meet both consumers’
and companies’ needs.
Yet, just as banks and other market actors used to “redline” consumers
based on their demographic and geographic profiles, e-commerce companies are increasingly using “weblining” to target and segment e-customers
based on their demographics and Internet use patterns. Companies with an
online presence, such as banks, may develop account profiles of individual
customers. These profiles “help the firm determine how much time, effort,
or investment should be devoted to those customers.”445 These companies
give customers who generate, or who are likely to generate, more money for
the firm higher ratings. The ratings often determine whether the company
will refuse to serve certain customers, charge higher fees or prices to certain
customers, or give certain customers lower quality products and substandard
customer service. These ratings consist of standard financial information
such as credit scores, but often also include demographic and other information obtained through data mining. Programs track “[i]ndividuals’ race,
ethnicity, sexual orientation, personal habits, web-browsing practices, lifestyle choices, health status, political persuasion,” zip codes, and other information.446 As with redlining, the negative effect of weblining is to make
some customers pay more for the same service or to deny some customers
service based on proxies for value. Companies use this data to predict customers’ behavior and then to segment markets based on that presumed behavior. As redlining made a geographic map of individuals’ residences and
presumed certain economic behavior based on their race and their residence,
weblining makes a “map of your travels across the Web” and may deny you
opportunities based on presumptions about your digital self.447
Economically marginalized and historically disadvantaged individuals
can be weblined as a result of using cyberfinancing markets. Other ecommerce sites can obtain not only the personal and financial information
users provide to cyberfinancing sites, but also the ratings that those sites
produce about their borrowers’ creditworthiness or their entrepreneurs’
popularity. The ratings and reputations that economically marginalized
445
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and geographically isolated market actors develop through their participation in cyberfinancing can begin to define their “digital” selves. As economic activity increasingly moves online, these determinations can impact
how they will be rated or received on other e-commerce sites. These determinations can either enhance or undermine an individual’s economic
and social mobility. Most importantly, this will occur unbeknownst to the
individuals affected and may remain largely out of their control.
B. Comparative Institutional Analysis for Economic Justice
The SEC and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA),448
as the predominant institutions regulating the development of these cyberfinancing markets, are privileging lenders’ and investors’ interests over
those of borrowers and entrepreneurs. As a result, this Article argues that
several American regulators must coordinate to advance economic justice
and to halt the unjust evolution of cyberfinancing markets. Since not all
economic actors in cyberfinancing markets are similarly situated, and because these markets represent an unprecedented economic development
opportunity for historically marginalized economic actors, the United
States must balance the regulatory goal of economic justice against the
competing objective of efficiency in order to promote the socially optimal
regulation of these markets. Substituting economic justice as a regulatory
goal, however, does not resolve the important question of institutional
choice. Law and economics scholar Neil Komesar explains, “the choice of
goals standing on its own dictates virtually nothing about law and public
policy.”449 Comparative institutional analysis requires scholars to compare
the relative merits of various large-scale institutions—the market, the legislature, or the judiciary—in accomplishing a given goal. The operative question is: given distributive justice as an additional or competing goal, which
large-scale institutions should cooperatively regulate to attain that goal or, at
least, to balance that goal against the competing choice of efficiency?
The initial trajectory of cyberfinancing markets revealed that these markets, in pursuit of efficiency gains, did privilege all market actors’ access
as an operative goal to gain a competitive advantage over other financial
448
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institutions. Yet, as these markets evolved and courted more mainstream
economic actors, they created benefits for lenders and investors and restricted marginalized actors’ access. Thus, an unregulated market—operating
alone—is insufficient to actualize long-term distributive justice. The nonprofit organizational structure, which used to primarily facilitate exchange
between the poor and the wealthy, is now insufficient—acting alone—to regulate all financial interactions between the poor and the wealthy in cyberspace.
Because cyberfinancing intermediaries adopt a variety of organizational forms and endeavor to advance both profit-making and social goals,
state charities’ regulators and the IRS—acting alone—are insufficient regulators of these market processes. Thus far, the political process—in the
form of legislation to regulate P2P lending and crowdfunding—has let
regulatory institutions that privilege mainstream economic actors’ interests
shape regulatory responses. The SEC’s effort to regulate P2P lending led
the intermediaries to restrict marginalized actors’ access and impose additional costs and burdens on borrowers. Although the JOBS Act holds
promise for enhancing marginalized actors’ participation in these markets,
it too imposes costs on small, fledgling entrepreneurs in order to provide
benefits to mainstream investors. Thus, the regulatory process is leading to
an ossification of a pro-lender and investor bias. Regulatory capture may
also affect the SEC’s rulemaking process, enabling the interests of more
established equity investors to predominate over the interests of first-time
entrepreneurs seeking alternative sources of capital for their endeavors.450
Given the emerging and complex nature of cyberfinancing markets, the
judiciary—acting alone—also does not seem well-positioned to monitor
systemic change and facilitate the actualization of this goal. Thus, this Article posits that all these institutions must coordinate to further economic
justice in cyberfinancing markets. In particular, the legislature and administrative agencies seem best positioned to lead the charge and to help the
other institutions respond. This is essential if cyberfinancing markets are
to realize their distributive potential.
1. Revising JOBS Act Provisions for Economic Justice
Through its rulemaking authority, the SEC should create implementing regulations that protect inexperienced EGCs from unintentional and
450
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insignificant violations of the JOBS Act’s disclosure and reporting requirements. Just as Rule 508 of Regulation D contains a “substantial compliance rule,” which provides private placement securities issuers a defense against innocent and immaterial violations of the exemption’s
disclosure and reporting requirements,451 the SEC should create a “substantial compliance rule” that provides EGCs issuing crowdfunding securities an innocent and immaterial defense.452 While this rule may sacrifice
benefits to investors by limiting the distribution of perfect information, it
will advance distributive justice by eliminating barriers to the participation
of smaller, unsophisticated EGCs.
The SEC should also create a “two-tier system” for the crowdfunding exemption that provides EGCs obtaining relatively small investments from a
large number of investors with a reduced disclosure burden.453 However, unlike the approach recommended by the ASBC, this reduced disclosure burden
should apply to all small offerings instead of only local offerings. The rationale for a small local offering exemption is that those who invest in companies in close geographical proximity can more easily obtain information
about issuing EGCs because they can “see the products, visit the local office,
meet with management and staff—all of which are difficult for long-distance
investments.”454 Although this may be true, for many economically and geographically marginalized EGCs, these geographic limitations will undermine
crowdfunding’s redistributive potential.
Consequently, the SEC should also create a reduced regulatory burden
for ECGs that sell an aggregate of up to only $100,000 to investors in a
twelve-month period and who do not sell more than an aggregate of $250 to
any one investor in a twelve-month period.455 Although this proposal leaves
intact higher disclosure requirements for marginalized EGCs who receive
higher investments, it reduces the regulatory burden for smaller amounts.
Two hundred fifty dollars from 1000 investors each can be a significant
amount for a first-time entrepreneur, whereas the risk of loss of $250 to one
individual is not as great as the benefit to the entrepreneur.456 Finally, the
SEC’s role as regulator is limited to enforcing and monitoring information disclosures in the sale of crowdfunding equity interests, an appropriate role for the
SEC. However, other regulators should also monitor crowdfunding intermediaries’ performance in facilitating economic justice in these markets. Yet, the
existing regulatory structure does not identify a regulator for this function.
451
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2. Modernizing the CRA and Facilitating Regulatory Coordination
Given that cyberfinancing intermediaries adopt a range of organizational
forms and perform some of the intermediating functions of banks and other
financial services institutions, the existing legal framework of consumer
protection, financial access, community economic development, and financial education should be harmonized with and adapted to the new institutional realities of cyberspace and e-commerce. As globalization and financial modernization extricate financial markets from the restrictions of instiinstitutional and geographic boundaries, the law must also adapt. The CRA
is the preeminent statute that expands geographically isolated and economically marginalized economic actors’ access to legitimate financial institutions. CRA accomplishes this because by forcing large traditional banks and
thrifts to lend in low-income minority communities, in a responsible way, it
remedies both the geographic and non-geographic market failures that preclude low-income and economically marginalized actors from accessing
mainstream markets.457 CRA responds to geographic market failures by increasing the number of transactions to low-income communities; and thereby
enhancing the information about, and “market thickness” for, lending and investing to low-income individuals and communities.458 CRA could also help
promote market thickness and minimize information asymmetries about lending and investing to low-income, geographically isolated, and economically
marginalized individuals in cyberspace.
Yet the CRA’s protections have not kept pace with institutional changes
in the financial services delivery system in the United States. The controversial Community Reinvestment Modernization Act of 2009 (CRMA),459
which died in committee, held the most promise to extend CRA obligations to
other financial institutions. Borrowing from CRMA’s innovations, this Article recommends that the CRA’s protections should be extended to cover a
range of non-depository institutions and nonbank affiliates that engage in
“banking products and services,”460 such as mortgage lenders, securities
companies, insurance companies, and large credit unions.461 Further, the
CRA should cover new large cyberfinancing intermediary portals and the
457
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banking institutions with whom they partner. Despite a particular crowdfunding intermediary’s organizational structure (that is, for-profit or non-profit), if
the organization fulfills a substantial financial function, such as Kiva, then it
should be covered by CRA’s provisions.462 However, CRA’s implementing
regulations should create a reduced regulatory burden for non-profit or forprofit intermediaries that are primarily established to advance charitable or
social justice goals. Additionally, federal and state laws regulating charitable
non-profits should be harmonized with existing federal and state securities
laws and regulations.463 Currently, non-profits formed for charitable purposes
are exempt from certain securities registration requirements.464 As a result, it
is unclear if non-profits would be covered by the JOBS Act’s crowdfunding
provisions covering “funding portals,” and “EGCs.”
The revised CRA statute, proposed here, would acknowledge that all financial sectors, such as mortgage banks, securities companies, insurance
companies, large credit unions, and new cyberfinancing intermediaries,
have affirmative obligations to meet the financial needs of the communities
they serve, including low- to moderate-income neighborhoods and economically marginal and historically disadvantaged users of cyberfinancing markets. Like the CRMA, the CRA statute would include a revised “assessment
area” definition that includes not only the geographic areas where covered
financial institutions have a physical presence, have ATMs, or where they
purchase or originate loans, but also geographic areas and cyberspaces
where the institution “enjoys 0.5 percent of the market share of the business
in a particular community, and where ‘the great majority’ of [its] ... business
originates.”465 This rule would force cyberfinancing intermediaries to find
ways to financially serve American markets and users from low- to moderate-income geographic areas in the United States.466
Equity crowdfunding intermediaries would be securities companies under the statute, and therefore, the SEC would have additional responsibilities to ensure that such institutions fulfill their CRA obligations.467 Mortgage banks, insurance companies, and large credit unions would be regulated
by the CFPB, but other regulators—such as the Treasury, the Secretary of
462
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Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and the Federal Reserve System—would coordinate with the CFPB. Similar to the reporting requirements under CRMA, the revised CRA statute should require all covered
financial institutions to collect and report to regulators important demographic data on users, the distribution of loans to borrowers, and investments to entrepreneurs. This data would be made available to the public
for three years.468 Further, like the CRMA, the CRA statute proposed here
would expand the CRA ratings process to include more gradations and to
generate multiple assessment ratings as well as an overall rating. The proposed CRA statute would add the ratings of “low satisfactory” and “high
satisfactory,” and it would adopt the CRMA’s requirement that all institutions that receive a “low satisfactory” or “needs to improve” rating submit
to the CFPB a “CRA improvement plan” that would be made public and
available for comment.”469 The revised CRA statute would also authorize
regulators to impose significant penalties on covered institutions for substantial compliance failures. Notably, smaller P2P lenders or cyberfinancing
intermediaries that generate less than $20 million in revenue would not be
subject to these requirements because the costs of the regulatory burden
would preclude such organizations from participating in cyberfinancing
markets. Further, the revised CRA statute would not provide private litigants a private right of action to submit agency implementation of the act
to judicial review because the costs of such a right, in terms of increased
litigation, might outweigh the benefits.
3. Public Subsidies and Market Incentives
The revised CRA proposed here should also give covered institutions
credit for lending to or investing in CDFIs that invest in P2P lending sites
or crowdfunding intermediaries that substantially serve low- to moderateincome individuals or communities, or that are established to serve an
economic justice mission. This would harmonize the existing framework of
American CED laws with changes in the financial services delivery system occurring in cyberspace. Further, P2P lending or crowdfunding intermediaries that substantially facilitate loans and investments to economically marginal or historically disadvantaged borrowers or entrepreneurs, and
that include such individuals on their boards, could qualify as CDEs under
the NMTC. As CDEs, these cyberfinancing intermediaries could receive tax
credits from the Treasury to spur private investment for socially beneficial
468
469
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economic activities. The public subsidies provided through tax credits could
spur private investors seeking tax breaks on profits to finance the costs of
the cyberfinancing intermediaries’ compliance with laws that encourage
them to facilitate lending and investing to marginal and historically disadvantaged economic actors. This would partially offset the costs of the regulatory burdens suggested above. This framework would also incentivize
cyberfinancing intermediaries to develop laws, interactive rules, and policies that will incentivize their users to interact with historically marginalized economic actors. Smaller cyberfinancing intermediaries, which are
not covered under the revised CRA statute, could also qualify as CDEs
under a revised NMTC Act, thereby incentivizing them to develop laws,
policies, and interactive rules that facilitate lending and investing to marginalized economic actors.
4. Self-Regulation, Community Education, and Legal Infrastructure470
As these cyberfinancing industries evolve and professionalize, selfregulation alone will not ensure economic justice. Thus far, the P2P lending industry has moved away from innovations that serve a comprehensive
market. As the SEC is developing its rulemaking to implement the JOBS
Act provisions, various industry self-regulatory associations such as the
National Crowdfunding Association—started by a financial lawyer—and
the Crowdfunding Professional Organization—started by an industry
player—are already vying for control of the crowdfunding market.471 The
CFIRA,472 which helped sponsor the crowdfunding exemption, also endeavors to lead the industry.473 Self-regulation in other industries has often
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led to a subordination of the interests of marginalized groups.474 Although
industry self-regulators can identify best practices for economic justice in
crowdfunding industries, U.S. regulators will need to encourage these industries to advance economic justice. Further, some industry self-regulatory
groups, such as the CFIRA or the Sustainable Economies Law Center—a
non-profit, public interest, legal organization—must provide community legal
education to help marginalized economic actors navigate this new terrain.
This training should not be required because it will inevitably raise cyberfinancing participants’ transaction costs, but it should be available for those
first-time economic actors who desire it.
Additionally, as legal scholar Gillian Hadfield eloquently explained,
the legal infrastructure needed to support efficient transactions in technology-driven markets that cross firm and jurisdictional boundaries has
not kept pace with technological innovations.475 The regulatory structure
for cyberfinancing described here will require the development of such a
legal infrastructure. Lastly, the regulatory scheme recommended above
requires significant regulatory coordination among agencies. The CFPB,
acting as a primary regulator, would help facilitate coordination, but U.S.
agencies must also collaborate. Coordination with international financial
regulators must also occur as the geographic boundaries between these
markets continue to disintegrate.476 Regulatory coordination is always
difficult, but the regulatory framework suggested above begins to facilitate the cooperation necessary to advance economic justice in these
emerging markets.
CONCLUSION
As new cyberfinancing markets facilitate exchange across boundaries
and among economic and demographic groups, the law must adapt. Although cyberfinancing markets present opportunities for individuals and
groups historically marginalized from American mainstream markets to access new sources of financing, they must be regulated to facilitate distributive justice. Existing proposals to regulate P2P lending and crowdfunding in
the United States do not advance economic justice. This Article provides a
framework for regulating cyberfinancing for economic justice that requires
474
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regulators to re-conceptualize the process of exchange between the wealthy
and the poor, as well as the legal structures that facilitate exchange between
these groups. Just as jurisdictional boundaries and land use laws order markets in geographic space, cyberfinancing intermediaries’ laws and interactional rules order who can benefit from the markets that occur in cyberspace. The United States must incentivize these intermediaries to encourage
the participation of marginalized economic actors in these markets. American regulators must also harmonize existing laws that regulate financial
transactions in the United States with the new technological and organizational innovations that cyberfinancing markets create. Just as space, power,
and law are linked in geographic space, so they are linked in cyberspace.
The United States must develop a regulatory structure that advances economic justice in these markets before they substantially evolve.

